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"[lit's All Right to Kill People, but Not Trees":1
Landowners of Environmentally Unsafe Properties
Must Be Held Strictly Liable for Personal Injuries
Caused by Their Contaminated Land
I. INTRODUCTION
Landowners have duties that are as fundamental as their right
of ownership. Statutory and common law often define those du-
ties to others according to the formal invitee, licensee, or trespass-
er designations; yet, modem jurisdictions increasingly turn to a
single principle: protect the defenseless or unwary with reasonable
care.2 But even this emerging emphasis on landowner duties,
1 126 CONG. REc. 30,941-42 (1980). Senator George J. Mitchell of Maine made this
2comment in reference to the "Superfund" toxic waste bill that would allow recovery for
property injury, but not personal injury. Senator Mitchell continued:
In this bill, we are telling the people of this country that under our value sys-
tem a property interest is worth compensating but human life is not. ... Sup-
pose a little girl plays in a State park. She is exposed to a chemical leaching
into the park from a dumpsite, and she develops symptoms associated with that
chemical, such as kidney diseases or cancer. [Suppose further that] [t]he trees in
the park die from exposure to this same chemical. Under the bill, . . . the
State may be fully reimbursed from the fund for the cost of restoring new trees
to its park. But what about the little girl? We have given her no recourse from
the fund. She cannot recover the money it will take to give her proper medical
care. She cannot be reimbursed in this bill for restoration of her kidneys or her
nervous system or her eyesight.
Neither logic nor compassion, good government nor common sense com-
pel this result. It is simply a failure of the will on the part of Congress to deal
with what is the most serious part of the problem-injuries to persons.
Id.
For a discussion of Superfund legislation and its failure to compensate victims of per-
sonal injuries, see infra notes 27-47 and accompanying text. See also Grad, A Legislative
Histoty of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Supefund")
Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENv . L 1 (1982).
2 The common law based a landowner's liability for injuries on whether the injured
party was a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. The landowner's duty of care increased with
each successive category. Modern jurisdictions have begun to alter these common law
doctrines and to apply negligence principles to determine liability.
Two forces combined to threaten the survival of the common law system of
possessors' liability. first, the mounting social pressures favoring compensation of
accident victims as an end in itself; and second, the growing tendency in mod-
ern legal thought to view formality of any kind as an unnecessary impediment
to achieving justice in every case.
Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. UJ.
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rather than upholding ownership rights, does not adequately pro-
tect people from environmentally unsafe land. The following ex-
amples illustrate how tort law has failed to protect those personal-
ly injured by contaminated properties.
Arthur Stevens was a plumber by trade, but during World
War II he worked at the Swan Island shipyard near Portland,
Oregon.' From 1943 to 1945 he covered ship pipes with asbestos-
based products.4 The vessels, dubbed "Liberty Ships," carried mu-
nitions overseas. After the war, he returned to his trade as a
plumber and never worked with asbestos products again. Mr.
Stevens died in 1987 from mesothelioma, a lung cancer caused by
asbestos inhalation. His widow, Maxine, netted $68,000 in settle-
ments after an unsuccessful suit against more than two dozen of
the nation's largest asbestos manufacturers.5
467, 511-12 (1976).
For a discussion of how negligence principles supersede the common law distinc-
tions of licensee, invitee, and trespasser, see S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE
AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §14:3 (1986) [hereinafter LAW OF TORTS]. The treatise cites as
a representative case Shepler v. Weyerhaeuser, 279 Or. 477, 496, 569 P.2d 1040, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1051 (1977), where the court denounced the common law classifications
as "formalism." In Shepler, the Oregon Supreme Court en banc said "[t]his emphasis on
categories and labels involves a high degree of formalism which experience has proved
to be a fertile source of unrealistic distinctions, capricious results and all too many ap-
peils on what should be questions of fact but are distorted into questions of law." Id. at
496, 569 P.2d at 1051. The seminal case for this holding, Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.
2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), blamed the common law distinctions for
producing "confusion and conflict" amid a "semantic morass." Id. at 116, 443 P.2d at
566, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
Numerous law review articles have noted the trend to move away from common
law classifications toward a negligence standard for possessors of land. See, e.g., Note,
Land Occupier's Liability-the Duty of Reasonable Care to All, 37 LA. L. REV. 1174 (1977)
(The standard for premises liability should be an answer to "what . . . a reasonable man
would do in light of this entrant's anticipated presence."); Note, Liability of Ownes and
Occupiers of Land, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 609 (1975) (recommending jury instructions which
employ a negligence standard on landowners for personal injury caused by their land);
Note, The Common Law T6n1 Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land: A Trap for the Un-
way?, 36 MD. L. REV. 816 (1977) (a foreseeability test within the negligence standard
should reduce "arbitrary and harsh" results imposed by common law principles).
3 Telephone interview with Mark King, attorney, Ness Motley Loadholt Richardson
& Poole, South Carolina (which represented Mr. Stevens and Mr. Wise in the two unre-
ported cases to be noted in the introduction) (Dec. 21, 1990) (hereinafter KING]. Mr.
King relayed all the facts from these cases.
4 Asbestos is a flaky, white mineral used for its heat-resistant and fire-retardant
properties. During application of asbestos products, workers often contended with clouds
of dust containing microscopic asbestos particles. The use of asbestos products was so
prevalent-and the resulting dust clouds so pervasive-that an estimated 21 million
American workers were exposed to the lethal mineral between 1940 and 1980. Labaton,
The Bitter Fight Over The Manville Trust, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
5 Stevens v. Celotex, No. 87-5019 (D.S.D. filed Jan. 26, 1989).
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Mr. Stevens could only identify Manville asbestos products,
but that company's bankruptcy filing stayed all such claims against
it.6 Since Mr. Stevens could not remember working with products
made by any of the thirty asbestos manufacturers named in his
suit, the jury acquitted them. More poignantly, Mr. Stevens' estate
had to pay court costs. The estate initially received $132,000 in
pre-trial settlements, but that amount was nearly halved by the
vagaries of the legal system: $18,000 had to be repaid for
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
(LHWCA) fund payments made while Mr. Stevens was alive; an-
other $40,000 went to Mr. Steven's attorney for his costs; and
$6,000 went to the asbestos manufacturers themselves as court
costs.
For more than three decades, Clyde Wise worked as a main-
tenance man at Killian Manufacturing in Ohio. One of his respon-
6 Under the protection of Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Manville Corp.
placed all its asbestos-related liability in the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust.
Once acclaimed as a visionary response for workers, the trust has become so financially
decrepit that federal judges are now vying to take control of it to ensure a more equita-
ble distribution. The trust began in 1988 with $815 million in cash and notes, plus as
much as 80 percent of Manville's stock. Starting in 1991, the trust is to receive $75 mil-
lion annually, and in 1992, the trust will receive as much as 20 percent of Manville's
annual profit. The money is not enough. The company originally estimated 100,000
workers would file claims. As of March 31, 1990, 152,000 had already been filed, with
hundreds of thousands more expected. The company also estimated a $25,000 average
claim pay-out. Instead, the payout has averaged $42,000. With $1.5 billion in assets and
$7.5 billion in expected claims, the projected shortfall is $6 billion.
Because of the shortfall, U.S. District Court Judges Jack Weinstein and Helen
Freedman have ordered Manville Corp.'s bankruptcy court settlement reopened, with
hopes of restructuring how victims will be paid. Weinstein has said publicly that all as-
bestos cases should be heard before one judge, with payment based upon victim needs.
The trust now faces more than 90,000 suits scheduled in 500 state courts representing
374 different jurisdictions, as well as cases in all 96 federal district courts in the nation.
See Galen, BAck in Jeopardy at Manville, BUS. WEEK, June 25, 1990, at 28; Labaton,
Complicaton on Asbestos, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at BI, col. 1.
Other asbestos manufacturers face similar trouble. Judge Weinstein recently agreed
to a limited fund class plan for Eagle-Picher Industries Inc., which manufactured asbestos
insulation products for 40 years. The Cincinnati-based company was facing an involuntary
bankruptcy petition filed by a group of plaintiff attorneys. Despite the filing, Judge
Weinstein created the settlement class and deemed the involuntary bankruptcy petition a
nullity. Critics charge the settlement class will result in fewer payments than a standard
bankruptcy petition. If successful, other asbestos manufacturers could similarly end their
asbestos litigation without petitioning for bankruptcy protection. Blum, A Routne Hearing
Turns Quickly Less So, Nat'l J., Dec. 24, 1990, at 8.
1991]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
sibilities was to keep the boilers running. Those boilers, with their
mass of asbestos-covered pipes, poisoned Mr. Wise. He died in
1987 from lung cancer. An autopsy revealed asbestos fibers in his
lungs.7 His only known exposure to asbestos was from the boiler
pipe insulation. So far, his widow Martha has received a $3,000
settlement from the boiler manufacturer, Babcock & Wilcox, but
nothing else. Much like Arthur Stevens mentioned in the first
example, Clyde Wise could not identify any specific asbestos
products used to wrap the boiler pipes. His case, filed on behalf
of the estate by his widow, Martha, in Dade County, Florida, is
still pending.
8
MacNeal Hospital in suburban Chicago rarely treated asbestos
diseases.9  Typically, Northwestern Memorial Hospital near
Chicago's Gold Coast'" attracted the area's asbestos patient refer-
rals, because it offered lung tests and other screenings to the
city's legion of laborers exposed to the mineral during the post-
war construction boom. From 1980 through 1984, however,
MacNeal admitted more than six times the number of mesotheli-
oma patients than it did from 1968 to 1974.11 The dramatic in-
crease prompted an epidemiological study of MacNeal's thirty-two
7 Mr. Wise's attorney must prove that his past exposure to asbestos substantially
contributed to the lung cancer, The defendant asbestos manufacturers have claimed that
Mr. Wise's exposure to their products did not constitute a significant enough exposure
to have caused the cancer. Telephone interview with Alan Petrine, of counsel to Ness
Motley Loadholt Richardson & Poole, representing Mr. Wise in Miami, Fla. (Feb. 11,
1991).
For the purpose of this Note, Mr. Wise's case represents those victims of a contam-
inated property who cannot identify the maker of the toxin, but who nonetheless know
where they were contaminated. Holding the landowner strictly liable for the injury would
shift the burdens of product identification away from victims. The landowner would then
seek indemnification from the parties-in Mr. Wise's case the asbestos manufactur-
ers-now named directly by the victims.
8 Wise v. Celotex Corp., No. 89-40795(15) (D. Fla. filed Sept. 11, 1989).
9 Wolf, Malignant Mesothelioma With Occupational and Environmental Asbestos Exposure
in an Illinois Community Hospital, 147 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2145 (1987).
10 David W. Cugell, M.D., heads asbestos-related and other pulmonary research at
Northwestern Memorial Hospital. One of the first doctors to pursue the lethal effects of
asbestos was Irving J. Selikoff, M.D. In 1964, Selikoff published a seminal study of the
mortality rate among insulation workers. P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE
ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 103-04 (1985).
11 WOLF, supra note 9, at 2147.
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mesothelioma patients from 1968 to 1984.12 To the researchers'
surprise, only three of the fourteen women afflicted with the
deadly cancer had work exposure to the lethal mineral' 3 Four
women were contaminated by family members who worked with
asbestos and five women had no known exposure "other than
residential proximity to [nearby] asbestos plants." 4 The striking
conclusion from this study was that "residential proximity to as-
bestos industries ... may be causally related to the development
of DMM [diffuse malignant mesothelioma]." 5 In fact, twenty-sev-
en of the thirty-two mesothelioma patients lived within a 3.2 kilo-
meter radius of two asbestos plants.
16
Justice has eluded the victims in each of these three cases,
because tort law has failed to accommodate the complex liabilities
arising from poisoned properties. Mr. Stevens' only identified
defendant has no money; Mr. Wise could not identify any singu-
lar defendant; and the MacNeal patients similarly face bankrupt
defendants 7 or a landowner/lessor who must be proven negli-
gent. The following analysis of these plaintiffs' legal options shows
why the legal system has failed them.
Product liability law offers the most logical and direct claim
for the plaintiffs mentioned above. Unfortunately, a combination
of dwindling asbestos manufacturer resources and often insur-
mountable legal obstacles typically thwart reasonable compensa-
tion."s As an alternative, the plaintiffs can also file a claim
against the owners of the respective premises. But under existing
12 Id.
13 Id. at 2148.
14 I&
15 Id. One Chicago trial attorney, who represented the Local 14, Chicago Asbestos
Union, said those "indirectly exposed" MacNeal patients died "because they raked their
leaves, shoveled snow and put cherry pies on their window sills." 'Telephone interview
with Terrence M. Johnson, Esquire, Chicago, Ill. (Dec. 28, 1990).
16 Id. The Unarco asbestos manufacturing plant on Chicago's South Side was a ma-
jor source of contamination for the MacNeal patients. Unfortunately, Unarco filed for
protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in June, 1982, the same year
as the Manville Corp.'s petition. KING, supra note 3.
17 See supra note 16.
18 The Manville Personal Injury Trust, for example, can only offer the current
130,000 claimants a promise of payment based on when the workers filed the claims,
not on their financial need or severity of injury. Other asbestos manufacturers presum-
ably will face similar financial difficulties. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1990, at F1, col. 1.
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law, that strategy would probably meet with an equally unsuccess-
ful result. For example, if the owner of the Swan Island shipyard
were also Mr. Stevens' employer, the tort claim would be barred
under the exclusivity clause of the LI-WCA; 9 Mr. Wise's claim
against Killian Manufacturing--provided the premises were owned
by his employer-likewise would be barred."
The residents near the asbestos manufacturing plants, howev-
er, could sue the landowner under premises liability law. If an
asbestos manufacturer owned the land, the company would be
liable to the residents for the "physical harm caused by [the] ...
artificial condition," provided 1) the manufacturer created the
airborne asbestos and 2) the asbestos manufacturer knew or
should have known of the consequent risk to the neighbor-
hood.2 If the asbestos manufacturer leased the land, the land-
owner would not be liable "for physical harm caused by any dan-
gerous condition" which occurred after the lessee took posses-
sion.
22
As the Restatement criteria illustrates, negligence is often the
basis for landowner liability. In the context of contaminated
property, the burden of proving landowner negligence could be
overwhelming. 2' But, even if a plaintiff was able to overcome the
burden and convince a jury that the manufacturer knew of the
asbestos dangers, the poor financial condition of the asbestos
manufacturers would put the plaintiff in no better position than
Mr. Stevens' estate. Similarly, if an asbestos manufacturer leased
the land for its asbestos plant, it would be difficult to prove the
requisite Restatement criteria against the lessor/landowner, name-
ly, that the lessor was in control of the land, knew that asbestos
was dangerous, and made no effort to alter emissions. In most
cases, landowners who lease land to an industrial enterprise could
reasonably argue that they were no longer in control of the pre-
19 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1988). See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION § 2.00 (1964).
20 For a discussion of exclusivity, see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 19, § 65.00.
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 364 (1977). For a general discussion of pre-
mises liability under the Restatement, see LAW OF TORTS, supra note 2, at 819.
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 377 (1977).
23 Litigation against the asbestos industry is an exception to the difficulty of prov-
ing negligence. At least some of the manufacturers, principally the industry's two largest
companies, Manville Corp. and Raybestos-Manhattan, knew of the dangers as early as the
1930's. See P. Brodeur, supra note 10, at 110-11. See also the discussion on disallowing a




naises, or were unaware of the tenant's property contamination.2 4
The chances of proving the lessor liable for contamination from
an industrial lessee might be slim indeed.
One way to bypass the difficulty of evaluating reasonable care
in the context of contaminated properties is to dispense with the
Restatement criteria altogether, and hold landowners strictly liable
for personal injuries caused by contaminated toxic properties.
Landowners would be required to control the toxins, reducing the
risk of harm. The application of this duty can be traced through
nuisance, admiralty, and products liability law. This duty has al-
ready been applied to residential landlords, but more significantly,
some of the nation's prominent lawyers and legal scholars already
have recommended that Congress enact legislation to enforce this
duty.
The original Superfund legislation authorized a study group
to recommend to Congress how it should approach personal inju-
ries caused by toxic waste sites.25 Dubbed the "301(e) Study
Group" after the Superfund section creating it, the Study Group
recommended that landowners be held strictly liable for personal
injuries caused by the toxic waste sites.26 This Note substantiates
the validity of that group's recommendation with one significant
alteration: contrary to the group's conclusion, this Note proposes
that worker's compensation should not bar recovery under this
duty.
Part I of this Note will discuss the "301(e)" congressional
report, emphasizing its continued relevance. Part II explains the
legal doctrines that support strict liability for contaminated prop-
erties: the Rylands doctrine, warranty of habitability, unseaworthi-
ness, products liability, and nuisance. Following these doctrinal
comparisons, Part III discuisses how Guido Calabresi's economic
theory of law, as well as George Fletcher's notion of justice in the
law, support strict liability in this context. Finally, Part IV discuss-
24 In Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1976), the court of appeals re-
fused to apply blanket vicarious liability to Amoco for the negligent acts of its retail
dealers/lessees. The court summarized the state of the law and stated that
"[t]raditionally, the rule has been that once control of the premises passes to the lessee,
the landlord is not vicariously liable for accidents which occur thereon unless he has
retained control over the premises." Id. at 276. See also id. at 275 n.12. For an exception
to this rule, see Green v. Asher Coal Mining Co., 377 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Ky. 1964) (when
the condition or use of a premises "is so potentially harmful . . . the courts will not
permit the owner to hide behind a lease.").
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (Supp. 1980).
26 See infra notes 27-47 and accompanying text.
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es why worker's compensation law should not be a bar to recov-
ery, and answers the expected criticisms concerning the en-
forcement of this duty.
II. A VOICE CRYING IN A POLLUTED WILDERNESS:
CONGRESS IGNORES AN EMINENT PANEL'S
PLEA FOR JUSTICE
In 1981 a group of the nation's foremost environmental and
tort attorneys recommended to Congress that property owners be
held strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by toxic substances
on their properties.2 7 Congress commissioned the "301(e) Study
Group" to study the adequacy of statutory and common law in
toxic tort personal injuries.28 The group concluded that the pres-
ent law was inadequate. 2 Ten years later, the law is still inade-
quate. As a result of the Study, Congress established the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and enacted a federal
discovery rule; however, none of the substantive recommendations
have become law."
27 The members of the "301(e) Study Group" included: Hon. Charles D. Breitel,
former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals; Jeffrey O'Connell, Professor of
Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Frank P. Grad, Professor of Law, Columbia
University School of Law; Weyman I. Lundquist, Esq., Heller, Ehrman, White &
McAuliffe, San Francisco; Frederick R. Anderson, Professor of Law, University of Utah
College of Law; George Clemon Freeman, Jr., Esq., Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Vir-
ginia; Richard F. Gerry, Esq., San Diego, Calif., then President of American Trial Law-
yers Association; Norman J. Landau, Esq., New York; Frederick M. Baron, Esq., Dallas;
Rufus L Edmisten, then Attorney General of North Carolina; Warren R. Spannaus, then
Attorney General of Minnesota; James R. Zazzali, former Attorney General of New Jer-
sey. Zazzali & Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies?, 13 SETON HALL L. REV.
446, 446 n.1 (1983). (James R. Zazzali, chairman of the Study Group, and Frank P.
Grad, Group reporter, discuss the rationale behind the recommendations of the Study.)
28 See Pub. L No. 96-510, § 301(e), 94 Stat. 2767, 2807 (1980) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 9651(e) (Supp. 1980)). Under Tite III-Miscellaneous Provisions: Reports and
Studies, § 301(e)(1), Congress commissioned the panel to study "the adequacy of existing
common law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm to man and the
environment caused by the release of hazardous substances into the environment."
29 SENATE COMM. ON ENVTL. & PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND
DAMAGES FROM HAzARDOus WAnSS-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES,
IN COMPLIANCE WIrtH SECTION 301(E) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 BY THE "SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY
GROUP, VOLS. I & II (Comm. print 1982) [hereinafter REPORT]. For a statement about
the inadequacy of law for toxic tort victims, see id. Vol. I, at 193.
30 Telephone interview with Columbia University School of Law Professor Frank
Grad (Nov. 2, 1990). For a discussion of the ATSDR, see infra note 32. The Superfund




The Study prompted an overwhelming response from repre-
sentatives of the insurance and hazardous waste industries, among
others, who claimed the recommendations were unjust, short-sight-
ed, and would cripple these and other vital industries.3' After
two successive years of hearings, Congress withdrew the victim
compensation amendment from consideration. To date, the far-
reaching Superfund legislation has no provision for personal in-
jury. 2 Ironically, the Superfund law holds property owners strict-
ly liable for the costs of a clean-up and damage to property,33
but the law does not address the more salient issue of how to
impose liability when those chemicals. injure someone.
In its 860-page report, the Study Group made 10 recommen-
31 Implementation of the Supefund Program: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Com-
merce, Transportation, and Tourism, House Enery and Commerce Committee, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 120-81 (1983) (statement of Sheila L. Birnbaum, representing the American Insur-
ance Association) [hereinafter SUPERFUND HEARING]. Birnbaum argued that "our tradi-
tional principles have been based on concepts of justice and fairness." She said enforc-
ing strict liability and joint and several liability, plus the recommended presumptions of
toxic waste disease causation, represented a "wholesale, radical abandonment" from the
tort system. Such a move, she argued, would contravene "the goals of justice and acci-
dent prevention that have been built into our tort law." Id. at 134.
Five days later, before the same subcommittee, Kenneth' Geiser, from the Tufts
University Department of Urban and Environmental Policy, described the Study Group
proposals as "too timid," and said: "The proposed liability for landowners and the fear
of future court activity, court suits, is one of the best incentives for encouraging com-
panies to reduce toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes." Id. at 263-66. For arguments
supporting the Study, see Statements of Dr. Nicholas Ashford, Director, Center for Policy Alter-
natives, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Leslie I. Boden, assistant professor, Harvard School
of Public Health; and Edward L Baker, M.D., M.P.H., Associate Professor of Occupational Med-
icine Harvard School of Public Health, id. at 280-314. Ashford warned the subcommittee
not to be "intimidated by the claims of an unscientific basis for the presumption" of a
causal link between exposure and disease. Id. at 282. Ashford -said that "we're dealing
here with justice; we're dealing here with erring on the side of caution, and you must
provide a democratic check on the scientific process to bolster your presumptions." Id.
32 Congress did, however, establish the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR) to "conduct periodic survey and screening programs to determine rela-
tionships between exposure to toxic substances and illness." Environmental Responses
Act, Pub. L No. 96-510, § 104(i), 94 Stat 2767, 2778-79 (1980). The ATSDR compiles
scientific data regarding effects of toxic exposure. For a reference to a recent ATSDR
report, see infra note 208. The agency was commissioned to assist injured plaintiffs in
overcoming some of the obstacles to proving causation, but Professor Grad said they
have not as yet had an impact on toxic tort litigation. "That was my hope, but litigators
are a peculiar lot. They sometimes would prefer to have people [in a jury] speculate
about injury from exposure than to have limits set by these documents." Telephone In-
terview with Columbia University School of Law Professor Frank Grad (Nov. 2, 1990).
33 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly called Superfund, begins at 42 U.S.C. §
9601 (1988).
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dations, the ninth entitled "Plenary State Court Actions: Removal
of Obstacles and Barriers to Effective Court Actions for Personal
Injuries Resulting from Exposure to Hazardous Wastes." 4 In the
ensuing discussion, the Study Group chastised jurisdictions which
allow statute of limitations defenses to thwart otherwise legitimate
plaintiff claims.3 5 The Study Group's recommendation also en-
couraged multiple-plaintiff suits, joint and several liability among
successive owners of contaminated property, presumptions of law,
and strict liability. 6
The "Plenary State Court Action" section of the report
showed the group's willingness to protect injured plaintiffs. With
respect to strict liability, the Study Group did away with the no-
tion of fault, duty of care, and responsibility.3 7 Instead, the
Group focussed on the "magnitude of the risk" associated with
the use of toxic substances, arguing that since the damage could
have such long-lasting effects, the liability must be a forceful
counterbalance." Similarly, the Study Group's recommended pre-
sumptions of law also reduced plaintiffs' burden of proof. For
example, if plaintiffs introduced evidence that they were exposed
to a hazardous substance, and that the exposure was reasonably
likely to have caused or contributed to the injury, then "such
damages shall be presumed to have been caused by such expo-
sure."
3 9
The Study Group was concerned that if it did not adhere to
the "magnitude of the risk" form of strict liability, then legal ob-
stacles could defeat legitimate claims.4" The Study Group's con-
cern was to protect plaintiffs' claims from being thwarted by the
rigors of causation.41 The premise of the Report was that insidi-
34 II REPORT, supra note 29, at 255.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 255-66.
37 Zazzali & Grad, supra note 27, at 462.
38 I REPORT, supra note 29, at 266.
39 II REPORT, supra note 29, at 117. The Study Group supported the use of these
presumptions for administrative hearings designed to handle less substantive injuries,
commonly described as Tier One cases. For Tier Two cases, termed plenary state ac-
tions, the Study Group retreated from employing the presumptions, and recommended
use of ATSDR reports (see supra note 32) which would aid courts in determining causa-
tion. Id. at 265.
40 Id. at 276.
41 The Study Group concluded that the essence of strict liability was "whether the
activity is one which carries risks of such magnitude that even if carried on with reason-
able care, the defendant should be held strictly liable for its consequences." Id. at 274.
In a criticism from within, group member Hon. Charles D. Breitel said some hazardous
[Vol. 66:893
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ous and severe environmental damage justified drastic mea-
sures.
42
Study Group Chairman John Zazzali said the group specifical-
ly recommended "that forthcoming legislation expressly exclude
injury due to occupational exposure;" -43 yet, the chairman offered
only two cites, a treatise and a law review article, as justifica-
tion.44 Compared to the thorough- discussion of strict liability,
substance users had no idea at the time of their use that the chemicals were dangerous.
I REPORT, supra note 29, at 297. "In some cases, the users were specifically told the
chemicals were utterly harmless or even beneficial"or essential, which later, or tomorrow,
w[ere] .. .discovered to be toxic singly or in synergistic relation with other substances."
Id.
42 "It seems that government and scientific sources agree that it will be impossible
to produce an accurate estimate of the number of hazardous waste injuries likely to
emerge." Zazzali & Grad, supra note 27, at 453., '
To support its argument for strict liability, the Study Group invoked cases involving
property damages from hazardous substances. The rationale from those cases could apply
to personal injury damages as well. For example, the linchpin for the Study Group's call
for strict liability involved a New Jersey mercury- processing plant. Department of Envtl.
Protection v. Ventron Corp., 182 NJ. Super. 210, 440 A.2d 455 (1981). The subsoil and
groundwater surrounding the Ventron plant contained 268 tons of lethal mercury depos-
its. The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the landmark Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E.
& I App. 330 (H.L 1868) to justify holding the owners, and their successive entities,
strictly, jointly, and severally liable for the clean-up and resultant damages to an adjoin-
ing tract. (For a discussion of Rylands, see infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.)
Ventron cited City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 NJ. Super. 169, 369, A.2d 49
(1976), to support a common law cause of strict liability "for unleashing a dangerous
substance during non-natural use of land." Id. at 219, 440 A.2d at 459. Although the
facts of Bridgeton similarly involved hazardous chemicals-recompense for the costs of
cleaning an oil spill-the values expressed in the case imply a justification for extending
strict liability for personal injury. The court in Bridgeton said that
[t]his generation of Americans has seen its boundary wasted by mindless and
reckless misuse. It has further seen the almost unchecked development of prod-
ucts whose misuse or improper employment lead to disfigurement and death.
The law is not-or ought notbe-so feeble as to exonerate those whose conduct
causes harm to others by reason of such use or abuse.
Id. at 178, 369 A.2d at 54.
Bridgeton did indeed involve property damage, but the rhetoric of the court implied
a passionate willingness to protect against personal injury.
43 Zazzali & Grad, supra note 27, at 465.
44 Id. (citing 2A A. LARSON, supra note 19, § 65.10 and Note, Compensating Victims
of Occupational Diseases, 93 HARv. L REv. 916 (1980)). Larson offered an impressive list
of case law adhering to the exclusive remedy rule, -and added his own philosophical jus-
tification: "[Exclusive remedy] is part of the quid pro quo in which sacrifices and gains
of employees and employers are to some extent put in balance, for, while the employer
assumes a new liability without fault, he is relieved of the prospect of large damage ver-
dicts." LARSON, supna at § 65.10. What Iarson does not address, and what his case law
shows, is that the "balance" between employers 'ahid employees has slanted decidedly in
favor of the. employers. The law that had origiraliy been championed by employees has
evolved into a legal haven for employers. See Has, On Reintegrating Workers' Compensa-
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this simple reference seems inadequate for such a value-laden
policy decision. Since the Study Group was bold enough to rec-
ommend "magnitude of the risk" strict liability in the face of ada-
mant industry concern for 'Justice and fairness,"45 it likewise
should have boldly recommended that the doctrine supersede
worker's compensation law. The same arguments the Study Group
made a decade ago are relevant today, with one exception.
Worker's compensation law should not bar recovery from a toxic
tort claim. While the Study courageously defended the general
rights of victims injured by toxins, it chose to accept present re-
lief for those injured on the job, even though some bil propo-
nents admitted that worker's compensation law was inadequate
for handling widespread occupational disease.47
lion and Employes' Liability, 21 GA. L REV. 843 (1987) (exclusive remedy should be re-
placed by a double-protection system in which employees have a cause of action for em-
ployer negligence.) Ironically, Zazzali's cited Note concluded that workers' compensation
plans "have poorly served those with work-related illnesses." Note, supra, at 937. The
Note encouraged reform because of the "grim harvest" of workers (one-in-four) exposed
to federally regulated hazardous substances while working. Id. at 916. The inadequacy of
workers' compensation plans was a consistent theme in the Superfund hearings. Dr.
Boden said that workers' compensation controverts more than half of the chronic occu-
pational disease cases, and that "[piroposed reforms are uncertain in effect and arbitrary
in nature." SUPERFUND HEARING, supra note 31, at 301. For a discussion of the inadequa-
cy of worker's compensation, see infra notes 47 and 169-96 and accompanying text.
45 SUPERFUND HEARING, supra note 31, at 282:
46 Id. at 123. The text of the "Workman's Compensation" section of the failed bill
proposed as a response to the report reads:
Section 1133. No person who is an employee covered by a State workman's
compensation plan which compensates employees for injury, illness, or death
arising out of and in the course of employment (or pursuant to similar. tests of
work-relatedness) may recover any amount under this subtitle for any such inju-
ry, illness, or death for which any compensation is available under such State
law.
Id.
- 47 Id. at 283. Dr. Edward L. Baker, M.D., said workers' compensation programs
must be changed or new systems designed to allow for occupational disease. "[Tihere
may be no satisfactory resolution to the problems of compensating occupational and
environmental disease within the traditional cause-specific compensation framework." Id.
at 285. Dr. Baker said physicians often must decide causation for worker claims, and,
unfortunately, "[m]ost U.S. medical schools do not provide specific training in environ-
mental toxicology and most physicians who have been in practice for a number of years
fail to adequately review recent medical literature." Id. at 284. For a discussion of the
inadequacy of worker's compensation in the context of contaminated workplaces, see
supra note 44, and infra notes 169-96 and accompanying text.
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Ill. FivE SEPARATE DOCT ES SUPPORT STRICT LIABILITY
FOR LANDOWNERS OF POISONED PROPERTIES
Victims of toxic torts are often helpless. Residents fleeing
Love Canal or Three-Mile Island, school children studying under
asbestos-covered pipes,48 or rural residents drinking contaminat-
ed well water are images which outrage our sense of fairness.
Anger at the perceived injustice, however, does not necessarily
help find the blameworthy party. Sometimes the instigator of the
toxic exposure is untraceable or bankrupt, which leaves the vic-
tims unable to recover. But, if landowners had a duty to keep
properties free from contaminants, then the victims would have
legal redress. The burden of pursuing an alternatively blamewor-
thy party would then fall on the landowner seeking indemnifica-
tion, rather than on a helpless victim.
Landowners of environmentally unsafe properties must be
responsible for injuries caused by contamination; otherwise, the
law would allow ownership benefits at the expense of misery to
others. In cases where the landowner did not know the property
was contaminated, or did nothing unreasonable to cause the con-
tamination, that landowner still must be responsible. Without
strict landowner liability, unwary victims of toxic torts often would
have no relief. The following analogies illustrate how the law con-
sistently works to protect the helpless.
A. Contaminated Properties are the Result
of "Unnatural" Uses of Land Likely to Cause Harm
Landowner liability typically is negligence based;49 yet, within
48 For a discussion of why asbestos manufacturers must pay for asbestos abatement
in schools, see Note, Recovey for Risk Comes of Age: Asbestos in School and the Duty to
Abate a Latent Environmental Hazard, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 512 (1989). See also Board of
Educ. v. A, C And S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428, 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989) (asbestos-containing
materials used in school construction were products for strict liability purposes).
49
In virtually all Anglo-American jurisdictions today, the owner or occupier of
private premises may be held liable for personal injury or property damage
occasioned by such owner's or occupier's negligence in the construction, mainte-
nance, operation, and the like for such premises-(subject, still in some states, to
various exceptions in the case of licensees or trespassers).
LAW OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 14:2.
In terms of protecting those outside a premises, "[t]he possessor of land is first of
all required to -exercise reasonable care, with regard to any activities which he carries
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the tradition of demanding reasonable care lies a venerable use of
strict liability, the Rylands v. Fletcher0 doctrine. In Rylands, the
defendant mill owner hired independent contractors to build a
reservoir on their land. When the reservoir broke, water flooded
the shafts of an adjoining mine. Though the contractors were
probably negligent, an arbitrator initially ruled the defendant free
of blame. Justice Blackburn of the Exchequer Chamber, however,
ruled in favor of the plaintiff:
We think that the true rule of law is that the person who for
his own purposes brings on his land . .. anything likely to do
mischief if it escapes, must keep at his peril, and if he does
not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which
is the natural consequence of its escape.-1
The House of Lords upheld the decision, because the reser-
voirs represented a "non-natural use," distinguished from "any
purpose for which it might in the ordinary course of the enjoy-
ment of land be used."52 American courts have since limited the
application of Rylands "only to the thing out of place, the abnor-
mally dangerous condition or activity which is not a 'natural' one
where it is.""
As industrial contamination increasingly attacks our environ-
ment and work force, the notion of what is a "natural" use of
land must be circumscribed. The use of dangerous chemicals and
minerals might have been essential to our rapidly expanding na-
tion sometime ago, but the repercussions now outweigh the bene-
fits of unbridled expansion. Courts have begun to redefine what
is a "natural" use of land to protect the environment and people
from toxins. For example, in City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil,
Inc.,54 the New Jersey court held the owner of an oil storage
tank strictly liable for a spill. What had once been considered a
on." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 57 (4th ed. 1971).
50 3 LRL-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L 1868).
51 1 LR.-Ex. 265, 279-80 (1865).
52 W. PROSSER, supra note 49, at § 57.
53 Id. § 78, at 512. See also Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts:
A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA LJ. 859, 914 (1981); Note, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine
in America: Abnormally Dangerous, Ultrahazardous, or Absolute Nuisance, 1978 ARIZ. ST. LJ.
99; II REPORT, supra note 29, at 264-68.
54 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976). See also note 42. For a discussion of
how the law of torts changed from a strict liability standard to a negligence standard "to
create immunities from legal liability and thereby to provide substantial subsidies for
those who undertook schemes of economic development," see M. HORWrrZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, 63-109, 100 (1977).
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common use of land in this industrialized state-storing oil-was
deemed dangerous:
In view of our developing insight into the impact of pollution
upon the environment because of the nature of this activity,
and the statutory prohibition against pollution, this is the prop-
er time to extend the concept of strict liability in the State to
those who store ultra-hazardous or pollutant substances.'
Twenty years ago, Dean Prosser noted that the pendulum has
swung in favor of applying the Rylands doctrine to dangerous
enterprises, rather than accepting such harmful activity as a neces-
sary aspect of industrialization." He stated that a "hazardous en-
terprise, even though it be socially valuable, must pay its way, and
make good the damage inflicted.""7
Landowners of contaminated properties must make good on
their duty to protect others from harm. Real property represents
a basis of wealth, whether it is used as a landfill or a place of
business. When that source of wealth is also the source of harm,
then the landowner must pay. In Rylands, the mill owner's reser-
voir was an important asset to his business; yet, he had to repay
the party victimized by his injurious property. Any number of
profitable or socially beneficial land uses could cause property
contamination, but these societal benefits cannot relieve landown-
ers from the duty to protect others from the contamination.
To counteract generations of environmental misuse, courts
must now consider any use of toxins unnatural, since society has
yet to fathom just how much mischief such land use has caused.
The proliferation of environmental laws in federal, state and mu-
nicipal jurisdictions shows an increasing legislative resentment.
Poisoned properties represent a non-natural use, because society
has become intolerant of these disastrous side-effects.
Just as the House of Lords in Rylands considered the reser-
voir in an unacceptable location, so, too, should American courts
consider property contaminants in a similarly unacceptable loca-
tion. The defendant in Rylands was liable for the harm caused by
his property, even though the defendant/landowner himself Was
not negligent. In the same way, landowners of contaminated
properties must be held strictly liable for the injuries caused by
55 Id. at 176-77, 369 A.2d 53-54.
56 W. PROSSER, supra note 49, § 78, at 509.
57 Id.
1991]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
those unnatural elements.
B. Contaminated Properties are Defective Premises
Which Violate the Warranty of Habitabiliy
8
By its own estimation, the Supreme Court of California took
"an unprecedented leap" in Becker v. IRM Corp.59 and held resi-
dential landlords strictly liable in tort for injuries due to defective
premises. 60 In essence, Becker allowed tenants to claim strict lia-
bility in tort for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.
The court in Becker applied products liability beyond the literal
context of goods in the stream of commerce and accepted the
analogy that a property can be considered a product.61
58 Prior to the warranty of habitability, a landlord was not liable for injuries due to
the defective condition of a premises, unless the landlord was guilty of fraud, conceal-
ment, or bound by a lease covenant. Besides traditional property concepts, caveat emp-
tor similarly protected landlords, since the doctrine was based on the landlord's lack of
possession and control of the premises. See Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises:
Caveat Lessee Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 WISC. L REV. 19 (1975). The common
law rule gave the landlord a cloak of immunity, since the lease was considered a convey-
ance. The population shift from rural to urban settings forced changes from that general
common law rule. Instead of instituting a wholesale restructuring of the law, however,
the courts simply added exceptions. Id. at 51. One of the exceptions held landlords lia-
ble for the undisclosed latent defects. To apply that exception, landlords had to have
known or had reason to know of the defect. Under the exception, the landlord was
liable to third-parties as well. In that sense, property law consistently reflected products
liability theory. The landlord was liable for the property defect to any who came to the
premises, just as a manufacturer is strictly liable to any who use his product. Contrary
to products liability, though, if the landlord told the tenant of the defect, then the land-
lord would not be liable to third-parties. Scholars have considered that limitation arbi-
trary. See 5 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 275 (2d Ed. 1986).
The doctrine of the warranty of habitability strips away any cloak of protection for
a landlord. Under the doctrine, a landlord is liable for any damages resulting from his
implied promise to make the premises habitable. The doctrine contradicts property law
doctrine defining a lease as a transfer of land. Instead, the warranty treats the property
transfer as something akin to the sale of goods, applying contract law principles like
mutually dependent lease covenants. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND
TENANT § 3:16 (1980). The first case invoking the principle was Pines v. Perssion, 14
Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961) in which the court allowed student boarders to
break the lease of a filthy house. The lightening rod for the doctrine, however, was
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Although Javins ulti-
mately ruled the landlord in violation of housing regulations, courts frequently quoted its
dicta, which eschewed long-standing property law for contract principles. See also
Freyfogle, The Installment Land Contract as Lease: Habitability Protections and the Low-Income
Pur .haser, 62 N.Y.U. L REv. 293 (1987) (courts should construe the residential install-
ment land contract as a lease, imposing the same obligations on the vendor-landlord as
on residential landlords).
59 38 Cal. 3d 454, 479, 698 P.2d 116, 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 230 (1985).




California's highest court said landlords were "part of the 'overall
producing and marketing enterprise, '"62 just like manufacturers
of a consumable product.
Before Becker, California and other courts had held landlords
liable for their tenants' injuries, but only when some product
within the dwelling malfunctioned, like a heating system that
caught fire," a couch in a furnished apartment that collapsed,64
or a wall-bed that tumbled off its hinges. 65 In each of those in-
stances, the court considered the dwelling's defective features as
products within a dwelling. But in Becker, the dwelling itself was
the product, not an amalgam of things -- a faucet, couch or heat-
er - that might separately be considered products. After Becker,
the dwelling itself could be considered injurious.
In Becker, a tenant of an apartment complex slipped and fell
against his frosted glass shower door.66 It broke and cut him se-
verely.67 Had the landlord installed tempered glass, the injury
would have been much less severe.61 In justifying an award to
the plaintiff, the Becker court traced the development of strict
liability theory, and compared its landmark Greenman v. Yuba Pow-
er Products69 decision to cases upholding relief for defective fix-
tures or for poorly manufactured new homes. 0 In Greenman, a
62 Id. The Becker court based its application of strict liability in tort on the warranty
of habitability doctrine, and ruled that "a landlord engaged in the business of leasing
dwellings is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a latent defect in the premis-
es." Id. at 459, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215. The rationale was that landlords
were part of an overall marketing scheme, and as such, "the fact that the enterprise is
one involving real estate may not immunize the landlord." Id.
63 Kriegler v. Eichler Homes Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969)
(builder of mass-produced homes liable for damages caused by a faulty heating system).
In Kriegler, the court stated that the purchaser
ordinarily does not have the means to protect himself either by hiring experts
to supervise and inspect or by provision in the deed, and that the public inter-
est dictates that the cost of injury from defects should be borne by the develop-
er who created the danger and who is in a better position to bear the loss,
rather than the injured party who relied on the developer's skill and implied
representation.
Id. at 228, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 753..
64 Fakhoury v. Magner,2-5' Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
65 Shattuck v. St. Francis Hotel and Apartments, 128 Cal. 285, 60 P.2d 855 (1936).




69 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
70 38 Cal. 3d at 458, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
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wood lathe malfunctioned, sending a piece of wood crashing into
the victim's forehead. Since Mr. Greenman had been using the
machine properly, the Supreme Court of California held the
wood lathe manufacturer strictly liable."1 The court in Becker
deemed Greenman relevant, since the earlier decision "was not
that warranty law failed to adequately define the manufacturer's
duty but that the 'intricacies of the law of sales' applicable to
commercial transactions might defeat the obvious representation
of safety for intended use made by the manufacturer.
"72
Presently, all but seven states have either a judicial or statuto-
ry warranty of habitability, imposing some form of liability on
residential landlords.7 ' Despite the potential upheaval from
Becker, or perhaps because of it, courts typically have restricted
the doctrine to residential premises, 74 and only Louisiana has
held residential landlords strictly liable in tort for a breach of the
warranty of habitability.75 Yet, imposing strict liability upon a
71 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 701.
72 38 Cal. 3d at 459, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr at 215.
73 Note, The Unwarranted Implication of a Warranty of Fitness in Commercial Leases-An
Alternative Approach, 41 VAND. L REV. 1057, 1066 (1988). The courts in Alabama, Flori-
da, Idaho, Kentucky, Oregon, and South Carolina have declined to imply a warranty of
habitability in residential leases. For a list of more recent cases adopting or applying the
warranty of habitability, see SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 58, at 67 (Supp. 1990).
74 An overwhelming majority of courts reject the warranty of habitability in a com-
mercial context. The following courts hold the minority view: Davidow v. Inwood N. Pro-
fessional Group-Phase I, 747 S.W.2d 373 (Texas 1988) (commercial tenant allowed to
withhold rent since landlord did not fulfill his mutually dependent duty to provide a
suitable premise); Tusch Enter. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987) (disclaimer
and merger clauses invalid as court invokes implied warranty of habitability to protect
purchaser of duplexes); Hodgson v. Chin, 168 N.J. Super. 549, 403 A.2d 942 (1979)
(small-scale entrepreneurs protected by implied warranty after discovering building had
structural defects - the court reserved judgment on whether it would extend the protec-
tion to large corporate purchasers); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 NJ. 444, 251 A.2d
268 (1969) (commercial tenant frequently flooded from premises allowed to vacate on
basis of implied warranty). For extended citations holding the majority view, see Annota-
tion, Commercial Lease Warranty, 76 A.L.R. 4TH 928 (1990). For a breakdown of implied
warranty of habitability application by state, see Cherry, Builder Liability for Used Home De-
fects, 18 REAL EST. UJ. 115 (1989).
75 For a discussion of why courts should extend the warranty of habitability to
landlords of commercial tenants, see generally Powell & Mallor, The Case for an Implied
Warranty of Quality in Sales of Commercial Real Estate, 68 WASH. U.L.Q. 305 (1990).
Powell and Mallor argue that commercial real estate purchasers often are no more finan-
cially astute than residential tenants. Since the warranty of habitability is a "creature of
public policy," the authors argue:
Courts should encourage builder-vendors of commercial property to meet such
standards because the health and safety of the person occupying the structure,
including employees who occupy a nonresidential commercial structure, should
be protected. To deny that protection to the ultimate user of the structure be-
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landlord was by no means a novel concept for the Becker court. A
civil court in the Bronx, New York, nine years earlier had dealt
with similar facts and reached the same conclusion.76 Admitting
the arguments against its decision were relatively forceful, the
Bronx court held the landlord strictly liable for a tenant's injury
in "the interests of justice."" Indeed, the Restatement (Second)
of Property the following year noted a 'Judicial and statutory
trend... that no one should be allowed or forced to live in
unsafe and unhealthy housing."
78
This same concern should and must be extended to unsafe
and unhealthy properties -generally. Unfortunately, judicial and
cause the owner purchased the property for investment. purposes makes little
sense.
Id. at 333.
76 Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d 745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1976). In Kaplan, a
kitchen cabinet fell on the plaintiff. The Kaplans originally sought relief claiming land-
lord negligence, but later attempted to amend the petition to seek strict liability under
the implied warranty of habitability. New York had enacted a warranty of habitability
statute nine months after the disputed incident. The statute was not retroactive, nor was
it a declaration of the common law, so existing law presumably favored the defendants.
Nevertheless, the court in Kaplan held the landlord strictly liable for the injuries. The
court said its ruling "would best serve the interests of justice" for the following reasons:
the landlord is in a better position to inspect and examine the premises; is in a better
position to know when to repair or replace items; is in a better position to spread the
loss; and makes a profit from the venture. 85 Misc. 2d at 749, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
Realizing it lacked the force of precedent, the court said "the development of the tort
and lease aspects of our law seem to lead to this conclusion." Id. (emphasis added).
77 Id. at 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 638. The court in Kaplan quoted the reasoning of a
New Jersey state appellate opinion in direct conflict with its decision. In Dwyer v. Sky-
line Apartments, Inc., 123 NJ: Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (1973), affd mee., 63 NJ. 577,
411 A.2d 1 (1973), the New Jersey Superior Court declined to hold a landlord strictly
liable for defective premises. Mrs. Dwyer scalded herself when the bathtub hot water
faucet pulled out of the tile. The corroded pipes were hidden behind the tile, and nei-
ther the landlord nor the tenant had any warning. The New Jersey court gave seven
reasons why it would not apply strict liability: the landlord was not engaged in mass
production of a product placed in the stream of commerce; the landlord did not create
a product with a defect preventable at the time of manufacture; the landlord had no ex-
pertise about correcting the condition; many different artisans combine to construct an
apartment, which then is subject to use and deterioration; an apartment is "wholly un-
like" a product that must leave a manufacturer in a safe condition, with an implied
-representation relied upon by-a consumer; the tenant cannot and does not expect an
apartment to be "perfect;" and to apply strict liability would impose an unjust burden
on property owners. The Dwryer court concluded that if a property owner cannot detect
a defect, the property owner cannot prevent it. 123" NJ. Super. at 55-56, 301 A.2d at
467. And since the property owner cannot prevent a latent defect, strict liability would
be inappropriate. Id. With judicial deference, the court in Kaplan termed these "quite
compelling arguments," but ruled against them anyway. 85 Misc. at 749, 381 N.Y.S.2d at
637.
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5 (Introductory Note 1976).
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academic reaction to the ruling has shown a reluctance for any
such expansion. The California appellate court was the first of
many in that jurisdiction to reject an extension of the analogy
allowed in Becker. 9 In Muro v. Superior Court,"° the appellate
court said "Becker was intended to be restricted to landlords of
residential property. There is no public policy rationale warranting
the extension of Becker beyond its obvious intent." l The Muro
court agreed that residential tenants can be considered powerless
"to insure safe, adequate housing", but declined to classify com-
mercial tenants as powerless.8 2  Like most opponents to ex-
tending Becker, the Muro court said the landlord of a residential
premises is in the best position to bear the cost of providing a
safe premise, but not so with a commercial landlord. 3 The ap-
79 Even before Becker, there was substantial precedent denying a commercial plaintiff
relief from a landlord under strict liability. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976), the California appellate court
said the doctrine of products liability "does not apply to parties who: (1) deal in a com-
mercial setting; (2) from positions of relatively equal economic strength; (3) bargain the
specifications of the product; and (4) negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects
in it." Id. at 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845. Post-Becker California rulings similarly denied
relief to commercial tenants. Gentry Construction Co. v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App.
3d. 181, 260 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1989) (commercial plaintiff denied application of strict lia-
bility to recover from co-defendant investment company); Mora v. Baker Commodities,
210 Cal. App 3d. 771, 258 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1989) (strict liability not applicable to lessors
of commercial or industrial properties); Sumitomo Bank of California v. Taurus Develop-
ers Inc., 158 Cal. App. 3d 289, 240 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1986) (strict liability not applicable
to lender in real estate transaction who bought defective construction project).
80 184 Cal. App. 3d. 1089, 229 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1986).
81 Id. at 1098, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
82 Id. at 1096, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 387. The court in Muro adopted the reasoning in 4
MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE REVIEW 364-65 (1977):
There is no reason to extend the common law implied warranty of habitability
to nonresidential premises. This warranty resulted from the necessity of protect-
ing the health and safety of residential tenants who need adequate housing in a
marketplace where satisfactory housing is difficult to locate and the tenant is
unable to protect himself because of his lack of knowledge, ability and bargain-
ing position. These factors are not present in the leasing of nonresidential pre-
mises where the tenant is more sophisticated, his bargaining position is more
equal to that of the landlord and, in the usual case, the contents of the lease,
including the obligation of maintenance, are negotiated between the parties.
Id,
Within the context of contaminated properties, however, these arguments are inap-
plicable. Employees, neighbors or others exposed to toxins rarely have such bargaining
power with the landowner of an environmentally unsafe premise.
83 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1097, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 388. Another California appellate
decision, however, stated in dicta that the commercial landlord did indeed have a re-
sponsibility to a tenant, though less than the duty demanded in Becker. In Mora v. Baker
Commodities Inc., 210 Cal. App. 3d 771, 258 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1989), a refrigerant vessel
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pellate court in Muro argued that commercial tenants can factor
those added expenses into the cost of doing business.8
4
Applying the Muro arguments in the context of contaminated
properties would be short-sighted and insensitive. Those exposed
to the unsafe premises - employees, visitors or those infected off-
site - are as unprotected. from toxins as Mr. Becker was when he
leaned against his shower door, and perhaps more so. Tenants
presumably can find other lodging and, so, leave the unsafe pre-
mises. Yet, the appellate court in Muro considered tenants unpro-
tected. By the same criteria, an employee has even less ability to
leave an unsafe workplace. If employees like Mr. Stevens and Mr.
Wise, or neighbors like the MacNeal cancer patients (each dis-
cussed in the Introduction), must accept the contamination with
little or no input about its conditions, then the party who owns
the injurious property must be held strictly liable for the resultant
injuries.8 5
exploded in a slaughterhouse. The appellate court exonerated the commercial landlord,
but at the same time offered some cautionary words to the exultant party.
[C]ontrary to respondent's assertion, respondent, a commercial landowner, can-
not totally abrogate its landowner responsibilities merely be signing a lease. As
the owner of property, a lessor out of possession must exercise due care and
must act reasonably toward the tenant as well as to unknown third par-
ties ... . When there is a potential serious danger, which is foreseeable, a
landlord should anticipate the danger and conduct a reasonable inspection be-
fore passing possession to the tenant. However, if no such inspection is war-
ranted, the landlord has no such obligation.
Id. at 781, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
84 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1098, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
85 Even those legal scholars who have decried strict liability as "seriously defective"
when applied to the warranty of habitability, admit the argument has merit in some
applications. Browder, The Taming of a Duty - the Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L
REV. 99, 136 (1982). Browder would apply strict liability in cases where a tenant is in-
jured by a defect unknown to both landlord and tenant, and that could not have been
easily detected by either. Browder justifies landlord liability by assuming insurance will
cover such costs. The implication, of course, is that few tenants could afford the neces-
sary policies. The Kaplan court made much the same argument. See supra notes 76-77
and accompanying text.
While Browder supports negligence liability under a warranty of habitability, Love,
Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975
WiSC. L REV. 19, 145 (1975) argued much more forcefully for strict liability. Love pre-
dicted an "intolerable inconsistency" between tort law and landlord-tenant law, a gap that
could be closed when "strict liability is imposed on landlords in the business of leasing."
Id. at 160.
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C. Unseaworthiness and the Jones Act-Property Owners
Held Strictly Liable in Tort for Personal Injuries
The duty of seaworthiness under general maritime law or the
Jones Act8 6 offers a compelling analogy for holding landowners
strictly liable for personal injuries caused by their properties. Un-
der general maritime law:
[T]he shipowner's duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel is abso-
lute; it does not require shipowner fault, and extends to condi-
tions arising after the voyage has begun and to conditions
created by the acts of third persons without any negligence or
knowledge on the part of the shipowner or his employees.
87
Similarly, a claim under the Jones Act requires only a minimal
86 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988). Under the Jones Act, seamen enjoy the same rights as
do railway employees under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1988). The Jones Act expressly incorporates the following remedy afforded railway work-
ers:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right of remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees shall apply; and in the case of the death of any seaman as a result
of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may
maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in
such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of
action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable.
46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1988).
The FELA and Jones Act adoption of common law remedies in tort contradict the
assumption that worker's compensation law is adequate. The FELA remedy can be, at
once, the most harsh and most lenient remedy, because, if the worker cannot prove
employer negligence, no matter how disabling the injury, no remedy lies. See Brummer,
Occupational Disease Litigation Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, XIV FORUM 205
(1984). See also Amchan, "Callous Disregard" for Employee Safety: the Exclusivity of the
Workers' Compensation Remedy Against Employers, 34 LAB. LJ. 683 (1983) (arguing for an
Occupational Safety and Health Act amendment holding employers and co-employees
liable for their willful, intentional, or grossly negligent conduct, notwithstanding any
worker's compensation bar).
87 F. MARAIsT, ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 196 (1988). For a discussion of maritime
liability for toxic torts, see generally Keefe & Warren, Toxic Exposure Litigation under the
Jones Act and the Longshore Harborworkers' Compensation Act, XXIV TORT & INS. L J. 691
(1989). See also Bluestein, Damages In Maritime Products Liability Cases, 62 TUL. L. REV.
511 (1988) (maritime law offers no set damage rules for injury from a defective prod-
uct); Hughes & Kelsey, Toxic and Environmental Torts Within Admiralty, 62 TUL. L REV.
405 (1988) (general maritime law offers toxic substance manufacturers unpredictable lia-
bility); Yeates, Dye & Garcia, Contribution and Indemnity in Maritime Litigation, 30 S. TEX.




amount of negligence to allow a seaman to sue the vessel owner
in tort.". Each doctrine focusses on the inadequacies of the ves-
sel as the place of employment. Seamen may sue in tort when
that "place" is unsafe. The protection offered seamen on a vessel
must be transferred inland. A landowner must be forced to have
an environmentally safe, toxic-free property. By simple analogy, a
property is a "vessel" in terms of liability, and when the property
contains disease-causing toxins, it should be considered "unseawor-
thy." The property owner in that case, like the owner of an un-
seaworthy vessel under general maritime law, must be held strictly
liable for any resulting personal injuries.
Courts already have allowed relief under the unseaworthiness
doctrine for injuries which parallel those that would be covered
under this landowner duty.8 9 In Petersen v. Chesapeake & Ohio
88 Petersen v. Chesapeake and Ohio R.R. Co., 784 F.2d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 1986).
The Fifth Circuit similarly held a reduced standard of liability for Jones Act claims. In
Allen v. Seacoast Prod. Inc., 623 F.2d 355. 360 (5th Cir. 1980), the court of appeals
stated that under the Jones Act, a seaman need only prove "'slight negligence', which
could be accomplished by very little evidence." See also Bennett v. Perini Corp., 510 F.2d
114, 117 (1st Cir. 1975) ("The.Jones Act is to be construed remedially, and . . . the
threshold of evidentiary sufficiency is somewhat lower than in tort actions at common
law."). For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's application of "slight negligence" in admi-
ralty law, see Miles, The Standard of Care in a Seaman's Personal Injuiy Action-Has the
Jones Act Been Slighted?, 13 TUL. MAR. L.J. 79 (1989).
89 For 26 years, the doctrine of seaworthiness had been moved inland via a single
Supreme Court decision. The Court applied the unseaworthiness doctrine to inland
workers in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). In Sierachi, the Court
awarded a stevedore damages against the shipowner, his employer, and others, after a
shackle broke, causing a boom and tackle to fall on the plaintiff. Through Sieracki, the
Court extended the unseaworthiness protection to any person aboard a vessel engaged in
work traditionally done by seamen. Id. at 95. The ruling led to a somewhat confusing
liability scheme in which stevedore employers would seek indemnification from the vessel
for longshoremen injuries. The Third Circuit described longshoremen actions prior to
the 1972 amendments as "a tortured liability triangle . . . played out on the wharves
and piers of America." Derr v. Kawaski Kisen K.K., 835 F.2d 490, 492 (3d Cir. 1987). -
Congress negated the Sieracki triangle of liability in 1972 by amending the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (LHWCA). Pub. L No. 92-576,
86 Stat. 1251 (1972) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1976 & Supp. 1980)). Section
905(b) holds that "liability of the vessel . . . shall not be based upon the warranty of
seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred." The amendments
abolished the judicially-created claim of unseaworthiness for longshoremen, as well as the
stevedore's obligation to indemnify a shipowner if the shipowner were held liable under
a third-party action. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988). By eliminating the claim of unseaworthi-
ness, Congress put a longshoreman "in the same position he, would be if he were in-
jured in non-maritime employment ashore." S. Rep. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1972). As a compromise for increasing the barriers to recovery, Congress increased the
statutory rates of compensation for longshoremen. For example, if a worker lost an arm,
he would receive 66.7% of his average weekly wages, plus 312 weeks compensation, up
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from the same percentage of compensation plus the previous 280 weeks of additional
compensation. The loss of a leg netted 288 weeks compensation, compared with 248
weeks compensation. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 905, 906, 908 (1988).
Congress offered the following rationale for jettisoning the unseaworthiness doctrine
for longshoremen:
The Committee believes that especially with the vast improvement in compensa-
tion benefits which the bill would provide, there is no compelling reason to
continue to require vessels to assume what amounts to absolute liability for inju-
ries which occur to longshoremen or other workers covered under the Act who
are injured while working on those vessels.
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4698, 4703.
For a discussion of the 1972 LHWCA amendments, see Pfister, A Review of
Shipowners' Statutoiy Duty under Section 905(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Com-
pensation Act: Does Scindia Require a Change in Course?, 1983 DUKE L.J. 153 (1983). For a
discussion of seaman remedies under the LHWCA, Jones Act, and general maritime law,
see Robertson, Current Problems in Seamen's Remedies: Seaman Status, Relationship Between
Jones Act and LHWCA, and Unseaworthiness Actions by Workers Not Covered By LHWCA, 45
LA. L REV. 875 (1985).
In 1984, congressional amendments again curtailed liability under the LHWCA, this
time by eliminating dual capacity claims. (The dual capacity doctrine, discussed infra note
179, holds an employer liable to an employee in tort despite worker's compensation
exclusivity.) Pub. L No. 98-426, 98 Stat. 1639, 1641 (1984). Section 5(a)l bars dual ca-
pacity claims which would implead employers as third-party defendants. The 1984 amend-
ments settled the question of whether asbestos manufacturers, sued by LHWCA workers,
had a right to indemnification against the workers' employers. Had the judiciary allowed
indemnification, the rulings would have had the effect of holding landowners strictly
liable for the personal injuries caused by the contaminated workplace. The circuit courts
ultimately denied the indemnification.
To resolve the dispute, the circuit courts had struggled with the question of wheth-
er asbestos insulators on vessels could be considered seamen, and so, escape the
worker's compensation bar to recovery in tort. The courts of appeals uniformly rejected
asbestos-related products liability claims of harbor workers, because the appellate courts
ruled asbestos insulators did not perform a duty they considered a traditional maritime
job. See Drake v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 772 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1985); All Maine Asbestos
Litigation, 772 F.2d 1023 (1st Cir. 1985); Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224
(4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 351 (1986); Woessner v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
757 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1985); Myrhan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 741 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir.
1984); Harville v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 731 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984); Austin v.
Unarco Indus. Inc., 705 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1247 (1983);
Keene Corp. v. U. S., 700 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983);
Owens-Illinois Inc. v. U. S. Dist. Court 698 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of
admiralty jurisdiction for asbestos insulators, see Gutoff, Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Asbestos
Torts: Unknotting the Tangled Fibers, 54 U. CHI. L REv. 312 (1987) (claiming the appellate
courts mistakenly consider asbestos insulation outside admiralty jurisdiction).
None of the six circuits addressing the issue confronted the question of whether
the available remedies for longshoremen were adequate. The discussion instead focussed
on the definition of a maritime occupation. The decisions consequently were devoid of
policy justifications for the rulings. For example, in All Maine Asbestos Litigation, the ap-
pellate court noted that the "[d]efendants have not cited us any authority that suggests
that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court would likely recognize the dual capacity doc-
trine." 772 F.2d at 1030. The court noted that "there are no reported cases even hinting
that Maine might deviate from the universal view." Id. at 1031. The unjustifiable lack of
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Railway Co.,"° the plaintiff died from asbestos inhalation while
working on railway cars aboard ships.9 Mr. Petersen, a machin-
ist, was a member of a railway car ferry crew which repaired
equipment on board while the ships travelled between ports.92 A
jury awarded Mr. Petersen's estate $235,500.1' The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the award, ruling the plaintiffs classifica-
tion as a seaman a matter of fact.94 The court of appeals similar-
ly rejected the railway company's contention that it was unaware
of the dangers of asbestos.
95
If the car ferry in Petersen can be considered the plaintiffs
place of work - which it was - then the same rationale would
apply to those injured by environmentally unsafe properties in-
land. Mr. Petersen worked in the car ferries, and the asbestos
dust in those vessels caused his death. His estate recovered in tort
from the owner of the lethal workplace. Because the Sixth Circuit
upheld his status as a seaman, Mr. Petersen received compensa-
tion that would otherwise have been barred by worker's compen-
sation law.9" Once the court placed the injury in admiralty law,
Mr. Petersen could receive compensation for the fatal disease.
Seamen need not be the only group that enjoys the privilege of
recompense under worker's compensation law for occupational disease, and the over-
whelming threat of asbestos disease to the work force, should have precluded the appel-
late courts from using precedent to support their decision. No prior situation could
compare to the plight of so many asbestos insulators, so, no prior court decision could
possibly be relevant. The appellate courts could be accused of using stare decisis and
the maritime nexus as a ploy to avoid answering the more difficult question: Have these
plaintiffs unjustly been denied a remedy in tort.
90 784 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1986).
91 Id. at 734.
92 IR
93 Id
94 Id. at 737-38.
95 Id. at 740. The court stated:
There was testimony that the relationship between asbestos exposure and lung
disease was known in the early 1920's. Furthermore, there was testimony that in
the early 1960's United States Coast Guard inspectors who came in contact with
asbestos aboard the ferries used masks and respirators. This testimony would
support an inference that the harmful consequences of asbestos exposure were
foreseeable during the period decedent was employed aboard the car ferries.
Id.
96 The defendant railway company unsuccessfully argued that Mr. Petersen should
receive compensation under the LHWCA, which would have barred his suit in tort. Id
at 738. Mr. Petersen's good fortune of being a machinist on board a ship, and the rail-
way company's vehement defense that, he was not a seaman, represent a microcosm of
how worker's compensation law can be used to thwart justifiable tort damages. See supra
notes 44 and 47, and infm notes 16996 and accompanying text.
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protection from a deadly property. The classification of seamen
seems shockingly arbitrary when considering the basic right of
freedom from contamination."7 The vulnerability of the human
body to such invisible and potent substances demands the judicial
protection afforded Mr. Petersen's estate.
D. Property Owners and Manufacturers Share the Same
Strict Liability in Tort for Toxic Products
Just as product liability cases focus on the injurious product,
as opposed to the conduct of the manufacturer or seller of that
product (notwithstanding the modern tort tendency to introduce
a negligence standard"8 ), so, too, must an injury from a poi-
97 The First Circuit faced the same issue when confronted with claims from asbestos
insulators who worked on vessels, as opposed to those who worked on land. Unfortu-
nately, the appellate court declined to make a definitive policy statement. In All Maine
Asbestos Litigation, 772 F.2d 1023 (1st Cir. 1985), the appellate court declined to treat
"workers injured by asbestos poisoning differently depending on whether they were in-
stalling asbestos in a ship or in an office building overlooking the harbor." Id. at 1030
(quoting Austin v. Unarco, 705 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983)). The appellate court emphasized
that the "state has an interest in providing uniform treatment to these two like workers,"
but the appellate court did not address the issue of whether its judicially imposed "uni-
form treatment" was equitable. Id. By contrast, the Supreme Court rejected an
employer's plea for exclusivity under the LHWCA in Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410
(1963). While not explicitly upholding the dual capacity doctrine, the Court nonetheless
declined to deny relief based on artificial legal definitions:
[O]nly blind adherence to the superficial meaning of a statute could prompt us
to ignore the fact that Pan-Atlantic was not only an employer of longshoremen
but was also a bareboat charterer and operator of a ship, and, as such, was
charged with the traditional, absolute, and nondelegable obligation of seaworthi-
ness which it should not be permitted to avoid . . . . We think it would pro-
duce a harsh and incongruous result, one out of keeping with the dominant
intent of Congress to help longshoremen, to distinguish between liability to
longshoremen injured under precisely the same circumstances because some
draw their pay directly from a shipowner and others from a stevedoring com-
pany doing the ship's service. Petitioner's need for protection from unseaworthi-
ness was neither more nor less than that of a longshoreman working for a ste-
vedoring company.
373 U.S. at 415 (footnotes omitted).
In Reed, a longshoreman filed suit against the ship for injuries sustained while un-
loading the vessel. The 1972 LHWCA amendments specifically denied the relief granted
in Reed. At the time the Court ruled in Reed, of course, Congress offered no such direc-
tion, nor has Congress offered any direction to the circuits today regarding how to clas-
sify asbestos workers working on vessels. Yet, each of the circuits addressing the issue
opted to impose the judicially-created definition of "maritime activity" to block relief.
98 In Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412,
(1988), the California Supreme Court declined to apply strict liability to manufacturers
of DES, a drug used to prevent miscarriages, which injured patients when injected in
utero. The court instead adopted a negligence standard, "because of public interest in
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soned property focus on the injury-causing property, and not on
the conduct of the property owner.
The essence of products liability, when uninfluenced by negli-
gence principles, is that producers and sellers should be strictly
liable for injuries caused by their goods. 9 That principle drove
the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products"' and its
progeny" 1 Courts and legal scholars alike have logically extend-
ed products liability principles to landowners of injurious proper-
ties. For example, products liability analogies played a key role in
holding California residential landlords strictly liable for injuries
caused by dwellings.' 2 The 301(e) Study Group similarly used
products liability doctrine to support the premise that landowners
be strictly liable for toxic tort injuries.' The Study Group
chose the analogy, because strict liability reduces a plaintiffs "in-
superable burden of proof, and because the imposition of liability
on the manufacturer most readily and efficiently provides for cost
internalization and for equitable distribution of the costs of prod-
uct-caused injuries, and ideally, liability on the part of those best
the development, availability, and reasonable price of drugs." Id. at 1061, 751 P.2d at
477, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 418. See also Annotation, Products Liability: What is an 'Unavoid-
ably Unsafe' Product, 70 A.LR. 4TH 16 (1989).
For a superb argument to restrict the creeping influence of negligence principles in
products liability cases, see Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YALE LJ. 353 (1988) (courts should apply true strict liability with contributo-
ry negligence as the only defense). But see Griffith, Products Liability - Negligence Pre-
sumed. An Evolution, 12 J. PROD. LIAB. 201 (1989) (defendants in a products liability suit
should be presumed negligent, and must then prove due care in the sale and prepara-
tion of the product).
99 "IThere is no question that the strict liability, whether it is called warranty or
declared outright in tort, extends to any kind of product which is recognizably danger-
ous to those who may come in contact with it." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 694 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KEETON].
100 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
101 In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972), the California Supreme Court cited Greenman in rejecting the requirement of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977). The Restatement argued that a prod-
uct must be unreasonably dangerous to invoke strict liability. The Cronin court said such
a standard "rings of negligence." 8 Cal. 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
441. Similarly, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978), the same court applied the Greenman rationale and ruled that a
plaintiff should not have to prove a product was unreasonably dangerous to invoke strict
liability against the manufacturer.
102 See supra notes 58-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the warranty of
habitability.
103 II REPORT, supra note 29, at 264.
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able to prevent or reduce those risks."" °4 The report further ar-
gued that a products liability standard of liability would alleviate
the difficult evidence questions posed by long latency periods or a
lack of scientific proof.'
Perhaps one of the purest applications of strict products lia-
bility in a toxic tort context involved the asbestos industry's un-
successful attempt to use a state-of-the-art defense.10 6 Under the
defense, the technological inability to discover a risk exonerates a
product manufacturer. In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Product
Corp., °7 the nation's largest asbestos manufacturer invoked the
defense against the plaintiff's claim of a failure to warn about the
lethal effects of asbestos exposure. In rejecting the defense, the
New Jersey Supreme Court separated negligence principles from
products liability:
By imposing strict liability, we are not requiring defendants to
have done something that is impossible .... [Such require-
ments] impl[y] negligence concepts with their attendant focus
on the reasonableness of defendant's behavior. However, a
major concern of strict liability-ignored by defendants-is the
conclusion that if a product was in fact defective, the distribu-
tor of the product should compensate its victims for the mis-
fortune that it inflicted on them.
108
The court justified its decision with four reasons: victims of
serious product risks should be compensated;0 9 manufacturer
profits should pay for the risk of liability;"0 the decision pro-
vides an incentive for safety research and development;"' and
the decision would simplify the fact finding process, since parties
would be spared the "complicated, costly, confusing and time-con-
104 Id. at 276.
105 Id. For a discussion of landowners as the most economically efficient party to
bear the costs of cleaning properties, see infra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
106 In a state-of-the art defense, courts deciding such cases have imputed knowledge
of a product's defect to the manufacturer, regardless of whether existing technology
could have discovered the defect. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 99, at 700:
The fact that a risk or hazard related to the use of a product was not discover-
able under existing technology and in the exercise of utmost care or the fact
that the benefits were overevaluated are both irrelevant if the product itself and
not the defendant's conduct is being evaluated.
107 90 NJ. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
108 Id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
109 Id. at 209, 447 A.2d at 546.
110 Id. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547
111 Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
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suming" task of proving what a manufacturer knew or should
have known at the time of production."
2
While the decision sparked a maelstrom of criticism,"'
112 Id. A Pennsylvania court similarly rejected a state-of-the-art defense for warning
and design claims. In Carrecter v. Colson Equip., 346 Pa. Super 95, 499 A.2d 326
(1985), Pennsylvania's superior court denied a state-of-the-art defense for a hand truck
manufacturer whose product caused an industrial accident, With a call to doctrinal puri-
ty, the superior court in Carreder stated: "We believe this holding requires us to forbid
any inquiry into the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct in the adequate warnings
area as well as the defective design area." 499 A.2d at 331. Echoing a similar stridency,
the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 740
P.2d 548 (1987), concluded:
Because our analysis makes defendants knowledge of the dangers irrelevant in a
strict liability action, there is no need to adopt the fiction that the defendant is
presumed to know of the dangers inherent in his product . . . . The fiction is
a byproduct of the unwarranted interjection of negligence concepts into strict
liability doctrine.
740 P.2d at 550.
113 Courts and commentators sharply criticized Beshada v. Johns-Manville Product
Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), because it imposed a duty on manufacturers to
warn against unknowable hazards. The court in Beshada relied on the risk/benefit theory
propounded by Dean Wade. Id. at 200, 447 A.2d at 544. Because Dean Wade agreed
that the court in Beshada properly applied his risk/benefit rule, he reversed his position
on the rule. Wade, On Effect in Pivoduct Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Market-
ing, 58 N.Y.U. L REV. 734, 761-64 (1983). Wade also said that Beshada "appears to be
straining too hard in [its] efforts to develop a different standard of product actionability
for strict liability actions." Id. at 744. In an article in the same New York University Law
Review issue, Dean Page dubbed the policy rationales of Beshada a "weak justification for
a narrower rule of strict liability." Page, Generic Product Risks: The case Against Comment K
and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 879 (1983). For other criticism of the
ruling, see also Epstein, Commentary, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 933 (1983) ("I regard the
decision as indefensible .... If our only goal is compensation, we should not handle
products liability cases through the tort system."); Gershonowitz, The Strict Liability Duty
to Warn, 44 WASH. & LEE L REV. 71 (1987) (Beshada created absolute liability, since
courts will always consider it more reasonable to have given warning than to allow the
possibility of an injury, even though the manufacturer could not have known of the pos-
sibility for the injury, and so, been motivated to warn.); Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to
Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L REV. 892,
902 (1983) (Beshada is "unjustifiable on grounds of logic and public policy.") But see
Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use
Data, 87 MICH. L REv. 1795 (1989) (Beshada represents a judicial attempt to mandate
safety research, using the "cheapest cost avoider" analysis); Note, Efficient Accident Preven-
tion as a Continuing Obligation." The Duty to Recall Defective Products, 42 STAN. L REv. 103
(1989) (though an efficient means of achieving product safety, Beshada runs the risk of
producing excessive investment in pre-sale risk prevention). For a discussion of the rele-
vance of manufacturer knowledge in products liability, see Annotation, Strict Products
Liability: Liability for Failure to Warn as Dependant on Defendant's Knowledge of Danger, 33
A.LR. 4TH 353 (1984).
The Beshada ruling fared little better in the judiciary. The New Jersey Supreme
Court in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984), limited the
Beshada ruling to "the circumstances giving rise to its holding," but the court expressly
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courts in other contexts have applied similar strict liability princi-
ples. In Little v. PPG Industries, Inc.," 4 the Supreme Court of
Washington cautioned that "the objective of strict liability with re-
spect to dangerous products is defeated if a plaintiff is required
to prove that the defendant was negligent, or the latter is allowed
to defend upon the ground the he was free of negligence."115
Little was a wrongful death action brought by the widow of a
steelworker who died while using a PPG chemical solvent. The
state supreme court considered the lethal solvent unreasonably
dngerous, and applied strict liability for the company's failure to
warn of the product's deadly potential." 6
Whether denying a state-of-the-art defense as in Beshada, or
denying the use of negligence principles as in Little, courts have
applied products liability doctrine to protect those blind-sided by
stated that "we do not overrule Beshada." 479 A.2d at 388. The court in Feldman re-
versed the Beshada ruling, and allowed a drug manufacturer to plead a state-of-the-art de-
fense against a failure to warn claim. Ms. Feldman suffered tooth discoloration after
taking tetracycline. The court in Feldman said "[g]enerally, the state-of-the-art ... and
available knowledge are relevant factors," and that "generally, conduct should be mea-
sured by knowledge at the time the manufacturer distributed the product." 479 A.2d at
386. The Third Circuit distinguished the Feldman and Beshada rulings in In Re Asbestos
Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1987). The federal appellate court chastised the New
Jersey courts for "imprecise" statements and held that "in New Jersey, Beshada does ap-
ply to asbestos cases but not to all products liability cases; and .. .Feldman does not
govern asbestos cases but does not necessarily apply to all other products liability cases."
Id. at 1241. For a discussion of Feldman, see Note, Rise of the Phoenix - Feldman v.
Lederle Laboratories: From the Remnants of State of the Art Evidence comes a New Standard
for Design Defect - Failure to Warn Cases, 16 U. TOL. L REV. 1053 (1985).
Other courts that have limited the Beshada ruling to asbestos failure-to-warn cases
include: Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Washing-
ton Law); Murphy v. Ownes-Illinois, Inc., 779 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985); Johnson v.
Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 740 P.2d 548 (1987) (applying Hawaii law);
Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So.2d 110 (La. 1986) (certified statement
from Louisiana Supreme Court in response to Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
788 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1986)); Lockwood v. A.C. & S. Inc., 44 Wash. App 330, 722 P.2d
826 (1986); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984). But see
Spartanburg County School Dist. Seven v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 805 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir.
1986) (applying South Carolina law in stating that the state-of-the-art defense, though
applicable in strict liability in tort, is not applicable to implied warranty claim.)
114 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979). See also Dart v. Wiebe Mfg. Inc., 147
Ariz. 242, 248, 709 P.2d 876, 882 (1985) (when juries evaluate a manufacturer's conduct
through the risk/benefit analysis, juries must also "impute to the manufacturer knowl-
edge of the danger that has been revealed subsequent to distribution of the product");
Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d 272 (1984) (defendant vendor of a
snowblower is presumed to have been fully informed of all product defects at the time
of sale, and state-of-the-art and culpability of defendant irrelevant).




toxins. In upholding strict liability in tort, courts have correctly
focussed on the injurious product, not on the conduct of the
manufacturer. With contaminated properties, the focus must be
on the injurious land. The conduct of the landowner, or any oth-
er negligence-based criteria like balancing the utility of a given
toxin, has no place in this equation. The product, in this case a
property, injured another and the product owner must be strictly
liable for the damages.
E. Liability in Public Nuisance."" The Common Law
Held Landowners Strictly Liable for Personal Injuries
Caused by Contaminated Properties
For public nuisance law to apply to landowners of contami-
nated properties, the toxic tort victim would have to show that
the injury was 1) suffered at the expense of an "unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public"18 and
2) was of a different "kind" than any injury suffered by the public
at large." 9 When a public nuisance caused personal injury or
physical harm to a property, then the plaintiff necessarily suffered
a harm different in kind from others. 2 ' In those cases, the
plaintiff can bring a tort action under public nuisance law.' 21
Although earlier public nuisance cases involving personal
injury made no mention of the duties inherent in land ownership,
courts nonetheless protected plaintiffs injured by industrial emis-
sions. In 1911, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a $50
damage award for the "discomfort and sickness inflicted upon"
the plaintiff and his family by a nearby smelter. 122 The appellate
court compared its decision to an earlier Supreme Court decision,
which allowed damages to churchgoers for the "inconvenience
and discomfort" caused by a nearby railroad machine shop.1
2 3
117 For a discussion of the origin of nuisance, see generally Loengard, The Assize of
Nuisance: Origins of an Action at Common Law, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144 (1978).
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821B (1977).
119 Id. § 821C.
120 id. "The general rule is that the private injury sustained where a common right
is impaired is 'merged in the common nuisance and injury to all citizens, and the right
is to be vindicated [through suit by a public official]." Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
628 F. Supp. 1219, 1233 (D. Mass. 1986) (citing Warner v. Mayor of Taunton, 253 Mass.
116, 143 N.W. 377 (1925)).
121 id.
122 U. S. Smelting Co. v. Sisam, 191 F. 293, 302 (8th Cir. 1911). For a list of similar
common law nuisince cases, see Annotation, Federal Common Law of Nuisances as Basis for
Relief in Environmental Pollution Cases, 29 A.L.R. FED. 137 (1976).
123 Baltimore and Potomac R.R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 332
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The MacNeal cancer patients (discussed in the Introduction),
who had no other contact with the lethal mineral other than liv-
ing downwind of asbestos manufacturing plants, could invoke pub-
lic nuisance law. But public nuisance law seemingly falls short of
protecting Mr. Wise (also discussed in the Introduction), who
contracted cancer from exposure to asbestos at work. Public nui-
sance claims generally involve a violation of a public right. In Mr.
Wise's case, his injury occurred on private property, so no public
right appears to be involved. The public does not have a right to
enter private property, so, no public right is at stake. Neverthe-
less, courts have bypassed this doctrinal limitation in some in-
stances, and have upheld a public nuisance claim for personal
injuries occurring on private property. 24 In St. Joseph Lead Co. v.
Prather'25, for example, the court held a mining company liable
under public nuisance law for the death of an adolescent boy
killed by dynamite. The boy was on the defendant's property
when a concrete warehouse of explosives detonated. The court
ruled that the warehouse of explosives was a public nuisance, and
that the plaintiff's presence on the property should not preclude
an action in public nuisance.'26 The court dismissed the pro-
(1883).
124 Downes v. Silva, 57 R.I. 343, 190 A. 42 (1937) (landowner held liable in nuisance
for unguarded trench on his property into which a highway traveler fell); McFerrin v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 51 Tenn. App. 13, 364 S.W.2d 102 (1962) (jury must decide
whether theater owner was guilty of nuisance for constructing slippery terrazzo sidewalk).
But see Cimino v. Yale Univ., 638 F. Supp.-952, 954 (D. Conn. 1986) (rejecting claim in
nuisance for an injury sustained when spectators tore down the stadium goalposts after a
football game: "the visitor to the [private] premises cannot base his right to recover up-
on the existence of a public nuisance."); Mulcahey v. ITT, 31 Conn. Supp. 1, 318 A.2d
804 (1974) (public nuisance theory inapplicable for claim of injury on premises of public
parking garage).
Municipalities have also been held liable for injuries caused by a nuisance on the
municipality's land: Hoffman v. City of Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 A. 499 (Conn. 1931)
(city maintaining beach for public use held liable for nuisance as a matter of law when
plaintiff dove off board into shallow water--even though jurisdiction offered immunity for
governmental functions). But see Bingham v. Bd. of Educ. of Ogden City, 118 Utah 582,
223 P.2d 432 (1950) (if not for governmental immunity, injury from negligently main-
tamined incinerator could have been brought in nuisance); Flamingo v. City of Waukesha,
262 Wis. 219, 55 N.W.2d 24 (1952) (governmental immunity protected otherwise valid
nuisance claim for injury from fall off a snow pile on defendant's property).
125 238 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1956).
126 Id. at 306. The court also stated that "[t]he maintenance of a house containing
such a quantity of explosives as to endanger nearby private property and persons there-
on and on an adjacent public road and railroad is a public nuisance as to all persons there-
on, with resultant legal liability for personal injuy or for damage to such property." Id.
at 304 (emphasis added).
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scriptions of traditional public nuisance doctrine, and concluded
thft a plaintiff can bring a claim for personal injuries under pub-
lic nuisance, even though the injury occurred on the defendant's
property.
12 7
Dynamite is a more volatile substance than asbestos or other
toxins, but they all can be lethal. Victims of occupational disease,
and others similarly poisoned while on another's premises, have
died because of the toxin's presence on the land. Though the
effects of a disease often take years to manifest, the results are as
final as the dynamite in Prather. The explosion in Mr. Wise's
lungs took decades, but the result was the same as the boy in
Prather.
Courts similarly have stretched the traditional notion of pri-
vate nuisance to accommodate a plaintiffs injury while on
another's property.12 1 Private nuisance involves a "nontrespatory
invasion of another's private use and enjoyment of his land."1
2
1
Despite this emphasis on interference with land rights, courts
have granted relief for personal injury under private nuisance
claims. These cases typically involve jurisdictions which statutorily
deny a claim of public nuisance for the contested action. In Saari
v. State,' the plaintiff was a volunteer fireman working at the
International Grand Prix auto race in Watkins Glen, New York.
He and other spectators were injured when one of the race cars
went off the track and struck them as they stood nearby watching
the race. Since the municipality had a legal permit to operate the
race on city highways, it could not be held liable under New
127 Id.
128 For cases enforcing a private nuisance claim for personal injury on the
defendant's premises, see Gesswin v. Beckwith, 35 Conn. Supp. 89, 397 A.2d 121 (1978)
(defendant's demurrer against tenant's nuisance claim overruled on suit for injuries from
fall off a defective ladder of tree house); Rothfuss v. Hamilton Masonic Temple Co., 34
Ohio St. 2d 176, 297 N.E.2d 105 (1973) (unguarded and unlighted window well on
defendant's property was a nuisance and plaintiff could recover for injury from fall);
McCabe v. Cohen, 268 A.D. 1064, 52 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1945) (liability for plaintiff's injury
from stairway on defendant's property upheld, since defendant maintained a statutory
nuisance). But see Ayala v. B & B Realty Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 58, 337 A.2d 330 (1974)
(tenant cannot sue in nuisance for a defect in demised premises if premises were under
tenant's exclusive control); O'Neill v. Marulli, 21 Conn. Supp. 373, 155 A.2d 58 (1959)
(claim of nuisance demurrable for employee's thumb injury from cupboard on
employer's premises); Acme Laundry Co. v. -Ford, 284 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)
(glass panels forming solid wall were not so inherently dangerous to constitute a public
nuisance, and owner owed no duty to business invitee who walked into glass).
129 LAW OF TORTS, supra note 2, at 97.
130 203 Misc. 859, 119 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1953).
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York's public nuisance statute. The court in Saari left room, how-
ever, for a private nuisance claim for the personal injury: "[The
race] did constitute a nuisance as to those persons particularly af-
fected thereby, for which they have a private right of action."
'Like the Eighth Circuit in United States Smelting Co. v.
Sisam, s2 the New York court took the cue from the Supreme
Court in Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company v. Fifth Baptist
Church,' when it stated: "The legislative authorization [prohib-
iting a particular cause of public nuisance] . . . does not affect
any claim of a private citizen for damages for any special inconve-
nience and discomfort not experienced by the public at
large."" 4 Similarly, in Rosario v. Koss,"s5 the New York appel-
late court set aside a verdict and ordered a new trial for a nui-
sance action based on a tenant's personal injuries. The record
showed "beyond question that the condition of the premises was
dangerous to human life [because it was] detrimental to health.
Hence, it was such a nuisance as comes within the ambit of [state
law] . . . even though it was a private nuisance rather than a pub-
lic nuisance."
3 6
Whether in public or private nuisance actions, case law sup-
ports personal injury claims against landowners of environmentally
unsafe properties. 37 The appropriate standard of liability for
131 Id. at 872, 119 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
132 191 F. 293 (8th Cir. 1911).
133 108 U.S. 317 (1883).
134 Id. at 332.
135 26 A.D.2d 561, 271 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1966).
136 Id. For a discussion of a landlord's strict liability for defective premises, see supra
notes 58-85 and accompanying text.
137 This argument does not consider the impact of state nuisance statutes. As early
as 1981, only 24 states expressly granted private rights of action for public nuisances. II
REPORT, supra note 29, at 191. Some jurisdictions have been unwilling to embrace such
a sweeping application of nuisance law. One recent decision expressly denied the propo-
sition that landowners be held strictly liable for their contaminated properties:
[M]ere ownership of property without anything more cannot and should not be
the determinative factor in imposing liability . . . . In this industrial age owner-
ship has no more relationship to the problems of pollution than did the theory
of privity of contract to the problem of products liability. As the privity of con-
tract theory prevented just results and enabled the party responsible for defects
in products to escape, so would blind adherence to a theory making every land-
owner liable for pollution on his land regardless of the source of that pollution.
N.J. v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 464, 485, 376 A.2d 1339, 1349-50 (1977) (cited in
GINSBERG & WEISS, supra note 53, at 886).
The above contention - that strict liability for environmental hazards is as unjustifi-
able as the archaic use of privity of contract in products liability - is inapplicable. The
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those landowners must be strict liability, since lethal toxins are ab-
normally dangerous per se. ss But applying the standard to all
landowners will be difficult. For example, some courts have re-
fused to apply strict liability for damages from hazardous waste
disposal, because safe methods of disposal do exist."s Similarly,
a passive owner of a contaminated property might not be consid-
ered involved in an activity at all, rendering the abnormally dan-
gerous classification inapplicable. Present law does not support
holding the passive landowner liable for contamination caused by
a lessee, 140 but courts have used strong rhetoric when bypassing
negligence standards in favor of strict liability for active polluters.
In Wood v. Picillo,'4 ' the Rhode Island Supreme Court said "con-
cern for the preservation of an often precarious ecological bal-
ance" prompted strict liability in nuisance for the owner of a
chemical disposal site.
141
potential for injury from our soiled environment transcends the New Jersey court's con-
cern for determining the source of pollution. For a litany of reports detailing the severi-
ty of environmental contamination, see Tuohey, Toxic Torts as Absolute Nuisances, 16 W.
ST. U. L REV. 5, 5 n.1 (1988).
138 Liability under nuisance law can be for negligent, abnormally dangerous, or in-
tentional invasions. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 99, at 652-53.
139 Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental Contamination in California, 22
U.S.F. L REv. 31, 41 n.61 (1987). Because of a judicial reluctance to classify mere own-
ership of a contaminated property as an abnormally dangerous activity, strict liability in
nuisance in this context might prove "an imperfect tool for remediating contaminated
sites." Id. at 42. See also GINSBERG & WEISS, supra note 53, at 886 ("[N]uisance doctrine
will be impotent as a mechanism for gaining compensation unless negligence or a prop-
er case for strict liability can be established.")
For a discussion of strict liability nuisance claims, see Annotation, Landowner's or
Occupant's Liability in Damages for Escape, Without Negligence, of Harmful Gases or Fumes
From Premises, 54 A.L.R. 2D (1957).
140 "Except where he contracts to repair, a lessor of land is not liable to others out-
side of the land for physical harm causedby any dangerous condition on the land
which comes into existence after his lessee has taken possession." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 377 (1977).
141 443 A.2d 1244 (RI. 1982).
142 Id. at 1249. For a discussion of the case's policy ramifications, and a list of cases
applying strict liability in nuisance, see Note, Negligence No Longer a Prerequisite for Nui-
sance Actions, 17 SUFFOLK U.L REv. 461 (1983). For more recent cases applying strict
liability in nuisance for contamination, see Prospect Indus. Corp. v. Singer Co., 238 N.J.
Super. 394, 569 A.2d 908 (1989) (strict liability applied to successive landowners for
disposal of toxic waste (citing State Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J.
473, A.2d 150 (1983))); T & E Indus. Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 227 N.J. Super. 228,
546 A.2d 570 (1988) (ownership successors to radium processor were absolutely liable to
subsequent purchaser for damage, even though an intervening owner built a building on
the property and exacerbated dangerous condition); Kenny v. Scientific Inc., 204 N.J.
Super. 228, 497 A.2d 1310 (1985) (private generator of hazardous waste at landfill facing
potential absolute liability).
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The potential potency of nuisance, and one cause of its amor-
phous application, is its emphasis on the damage done, rather
than on any particular type of conduct.' Tort liability under
nuisance law often follows from the damage, and not the conduct
which caused the damage.'44 With the intensely significant poli-
cy considerations detailed in Woods, strict liability in nuisance law
must converge to hold both the passive landowner and others
engaged in otherwise "safe" industries strictly liable for damages
caused by toxins.
IV. ECONOMICS AND JUSTICE: APPARENTLY
CONTRADICTORY BASES FOR POLICY CONVERGE
IN AGREEMENT ON THIS DUTY
This section will discuss how Guido Calabresi's economics of
strict liability in tort and George P. Fletcher's standard of fairness
support a landowner's duty to keep property environmentally safe.
For a discussion of strict liability in nuisance, see Annotation, Landowner's or
Occupant's Liability in Damages for Escap4 Without Negligence, of Harmful Gases or Fumes
From Premises, 54 A.LR. 2D (1957). See also Annotation, Tortious Radiological Harm, 73
A.LR. 4TH 582 (1989).
143 Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 399, 416 (1942). Prosser con-
cluded the article by suggesting that Texas attorneys sue under nuisance whenever possi-
ble, since Texas courts have determined "It]hat liability for what is called 'nuisance'
very often rests upon a basis of strict liability, without proof of wrongful intent or negli-
gence." Id. at 426. For a more recent application of this principle, see U. S. v. Hooker
Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 118 F.R.D. 321, 324 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Public nuisance ac-
tions do not depend on proof of actual harm but only the significant threat of injury to
property, health, or safety.").
144 When applying strict liability in nuisance, courts often quote the late Benjamin
N. Cardozo's statement in McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E.
391 (1928): "Nuisance . .. has more meanings than one. The primary meaning does not
involve the element of negligence as one of its essential factors. One acts sometimes at
one's peril. In such circumstances, the duty to desist is absolute whenever conduct, if
persisted in, brings damage to another" (footnotes omitted). See Morgan v. High Penn
Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953) (oil refinery's noxious gases constituted pri-
vate nuisance); Menolascino v. Superior Felt & Bedding Co., 13 Ind. App. 318, 40
N.E.2d 813 (1942) (dust emissions of nearby mattress factory constituted a public nui-
sance).
For a discussion of absolute liability in nuisance, see Tuohey, Toxic Torts As Absolute
Nuisances, 16 W. ST. U. L. REV. 5 (1988). The Tuohey article is doctrinally consistent
with Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 399. Tuohey argues for absolute
liability for toxic waste nuisances, because "toxins are life threatening, and not merely
offensive to sensitivities nor interfering with use and enjoyment of property." 16 W. ST.
U. L REV. at 34. Tuohey recommends a strong public policy supporting nuisance-based
liability for toxic clean-ups. He summarily defines toxic-generating or disposing industries
as "ultrahazardous and abnormally dangerous activities." Id. at 61. For other law review
articles supporting nuisance law liability for toxic torts, see Id. at 6 n.2.
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Though these two scholars typically are at ideological odds, this
duty gives them the unusual opportunity to agree.
A.. Landowners as the "Cheapest Cost Avoidersn "
Calabresi's approach to tort law attempts to allocate losses to
those who can most cheaply pay to reduce the risk of an acci-
dent, the search for the "cheapest cost avoider." 45 He refined
his analysis, particularly with respect to assumption of the risk in
products liability, in a jointly published article with John T.
Hirschoff.1' The joint article was an attempt to explain 'Just
where strict liability should stop."147
Calabresi and Hirschoff defined the notion of the cheapest
cost avoider as the person who can best assess the costs and ben-
efits of the action which caused the harm. This strict liability test
does not require a court to evaluate a given party's actual or pro-
jected costs of avoiding an accident. Instead, Calabresi and
Hirschoff said the court merely has to choose the party that was
in the best position to make that decision. This judicial approach
requires no financial acumen per se, just an insight into who had
145 G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26-
136 (1970). Calabresi addressed environmental problems in his book as well. He hy-
pothesized that the owner of a polluting smoke stack would be the lowest cost avoider,
compared with those the smoke affects, since "it is almost certainly cheaper for the fac-
tory to bribe [affectedj homeowners [to accept the pollution] than it is for homeowners
to unite to bribe the factory [to stop the pollution]." Id. at 254. For a discussion of
nuisance law and its applicability with this proposed duty, see supra notes 117-44 and
accompanying text. For an analysis of Calabresi's and other economics and law argu-
ments, see OGUS AND VELJANOVSKI, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF LAW AND REGULA-
TION (1984); A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989).
146 Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE LJ. 1055
(1972). Another widely discussed economic theory of tort law applies a negligence stan-
dard of liability. A champion of that application, Richard A. Posner, detailed this and
other legal applications of economic theories in POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
160-65, 180-91 (1986) (Posner's comparison of strict and negligence applications in tort
theory). See also LANDES AND POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 54-85
(1987).
147 CALABRESi & HIRSCHOFF, supra note 146, at 1056. For a discussion of Calabresi's
theory with respect to nuisance, see Calabresi & Melamed, Propety Rules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). The authors
expand on the notion that both parties in the dispute are in some ways liable, and both
must bargain to overcome the poor allocation of resources. For a related discussion of
this insight, see also Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW AND ECON. 1 (1960).)
Calabresi and Melamed further argue that in the absence of information as to who is
the least cost avoider, then the party best able to bribe the other should be forced to
so act. In our case, a landowner of a contaminated property is clearly in the best posi-
tion to bribe those affected, especially if those injured are his employees.
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the knowledge and expertise to have made the decision. "[T]he
strict liability test would simply require a decision as to whether
the injured or the victim was in the better position both to judge
whether the avoidance costs would exceed foreseeable accident
costs and to act on that judgment."
148
As an example of a manufacturer being a cheapest cost
avoider in a "failure to warn" tort claim, Calabresi and Hirschoff
offered a hypothetical situation of a consumer buying a drug
which had a .0001 probability of a deleterious side-effect - the
loss of a leg. Since the drug producer can evaluate the cost of
making a drug without the dangerous side effect, or the cost of
developing a simple test which would identify those .0001 of con-
sumers who could lose their legs, the authors concluded that the
drug producer was the cheapest cost avoider. By contrast, "the
consumer [wa]s not in a position to make this comparison."'49
On the other hand, Calabresi and Hirschoff did not imply that
"mere clarity of warning or mere percentages of likelihood of
harm" resolved the issue of who would be the cheapest cost
avoider. Such factors are only part of the analysis, which ultimate-
ly must decide "who was in the best position to make the cost-
benefit analysis and act upon it." 150
In the context of contaminated properties, landowners often
would be in the best position to assess the relative costs and ben-
efits of an act which might injure others through contamination.
Consider the injuries of the MacNeal cancer patients mentioned
in the introduction. If the landowner were a lessor, then that
cost-benefit analysis could be included in the rental rate charged
the asbestos manufacturer that leased the property. If the asbestos
manufacturer itself owned the land, then the potential of such
damage claims would be factored into a projected cost of doing
business.
When toxins from a property injure a person, only an ex-
treme situation would render the victim liable under this analysis.
Calabresi and Hirschoff explained that in cases where the
plaintiffs actions were "so unusual as to make the user more suit-
148 CALABRESI & HIRSCHOFF, supra note 146, at 1060. In a footnote, Calabresi and
Hirschoff explained that if the party in the best position to perform the cost-benefit
analysis is not the party in the best position to act on the analysis, then "the decision
requires weighing comparative advantages." Id. at 1060 n.19.
149 Id. at 1062.
150 Id. at 1063.
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ed to make the cost-benefit analysis than the manufacturer,"151
then liability applied to the injured party. But even when applying
the strict liability test in such instances, the analysis does address
potential unfairness to a poorer plaintiff. Calabresi and Hirschoff
suggested that courts attach liability to encourage a societal goal,
"such as greater wealth equality."15
In any case, none of the three victims of contaminated prop-
erties mentioned in the introduction was in the best position to
evaluate the benefits of being exposed, nor was their exposure
the result of "so unusual" an action. Mr. Stevens and Mr. Wise
were gainfully employed and wholly unaware that exposure to
asbestos would have such a protracted latency period. Similarly,
the MacNeal cancer patients did not know that living near the
asbestos plants would expose them to a lethal mineral. In each
case, the injured parties were decidedly not those best able to
make a cost-benefit analysis. Victims of contaminated properties
invariably suffer from an ignorance exacerbated by the pervasive
nature of toxins.
In a related analysis, Calabresi and Hirschoff considered the
doctrine of assumption of the risk "essential to an understanding
of a non-fault world."15 The authors described the doctrine as a
sort of strict liability against plaintiffs. For example, those who
151 Id. at 1064.
152 Id. at 1078. The strict liability test depends on identifying the party best able to
determine and act upon the cost-benefit analysis of a given act, and the "best cost avoid-
er" passing those costs onto the purchaser of the product or service, i.e. internalizing
the costs. But nowhere do Calabresi and Hirschoff explain how to balance the choice of
the best decider with the potential injustice of foisting cost internalization burdens on a
poor party.
For a discussion of how Calabresi's strict liability test advances distributive and cor-
rective justice considerations, see Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the
Calabresian Approach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677, 744 (1988). If courts con-
sider spreading both risks and wealth, the Calabresian theory probably will not result in
victimizing poorer parties. With risk and wealth distribution as a concern, courts can
mitigate the impartial nature of the "least cost avoider" designation. Id. Attanasio does
admit, however, that forcing a poorer party to "internalize" his costs sometimes leaves
the Calabresian theory open to criticism about its regressive distributive justice.
Attanasio questioned the Calabresi and Hirschoff use of determining liability by cat-
egories of defendants. Id. at 719. The two authors suggested that statistical calculations,
rather than a case-by-case adjudication, can best aid courts in ascribing liability. Attanasio
considered that notion contrary to autonomy, but did consider the possibility of using
categories in toxic torts: "One area in which category remedies may more strongly con-
nect with autonomy is toxic torts. Such massive litigation tends to be impersonal in any
event, and a more category-focused approach may be, the only feasible way to redress
these profound autonomy infringements." Id.
153 CALABRESI & HIRSCHOFF, supra note 146, at 1065.
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attend a baseball game, facing the risk of being hit by a foul ball,
are in the best position to undertake the cost-benefit analysis. In
that situation, as in any with this analysis, "strict liability is im-
posed regardless of whether the other party 'ought' to have done
what he did."154
The victim who engaged in a non-natural use of land, or a
zookeeper inside a tiger's cage to study its habits, both represent
to the authors parties best able to evaluate the costs and benefits
of their actions. Calabresi and Hirschoff move the decision away
from what a party ought to do, and instead focus on who has
access to the appropriate knowledge to best make the decision
and act upon it. By contrast, victims of contaminated properties
typically are unaware of the danger. Producing toxins invariably
involves a "non-natural" use of land, and the injuries represent
the resultant mischief. In most cases, the victim simply could not
have prevented the exposure, since the contaminants are so often
imperceptible. Even if a victim was to some degree aware of a
dangerous exposure, only rarely would that informed victim also
be in the best position to act upon that knowledge-the second
prong of the strict liability test. For example, even if Mr. Stevens
had an idea that his exposure to asbestos was impairing his
health, his career options as a plumber during wartime were limit-
ed.
B. Contaminated Properties Create Nonreciprocal Risks
George P. Fletcher has been uneasy with the utilitarian senti-
ment of modern tort law, and in 1972 proposed a return to indi-
vidual rights-based tort doctrine. 55 To Fletcher, determining an
individual's rights, rather than searching for "the party who repre-
sents the least disutility," represented the appropriate moral basis
of tort law.1 56 Fletcher wanted to replace the judicial search for
lowest cost avoiders with a search for "the rationale for and
individual's 'right' to recover.
15 7
To accomplish the doctrinal shift, Fletcher argued for a "stan-
dard of fairness" as the basis of redistributing losses. He took
exception to what he considered amoral considerations of "reason-
ableness" as the means of attaching liability. 5 Rather than hay-
154 Id.
155 Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theoiy, 85 HARV. L REV. 537 (1972).
156 Id. at 537.
157 Id. at 538.
158 Fletcher said appealing to a "reasonable man" standard to evaluate tortious con-
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ing courts employ a utilitarian calculus, Fletcher wanted courts to
determine liability on the basis of what was fair to the rights of
each party.159 This standard of fairness revolved around the no-
tions of "reciprocal" and "nonreciprocal" risk. If the defendant
and plaintiff exposed each other to a similar degree of risk (creat-
ed reciprocal risks), then no liability would apply. Conversely, if
the defendant exposed the plaintiff to a greater risk, courts must
hold that defendant liable. For example, driving in traffic is a
reciprocal risk. If two careful drivers collided, no liability would
attach, since the risk of one driver hitting another was reciprocal.
But, if a person drove recklessly, then under Fletcher's standard
of fairness, the reckless driver exposed the victim to an
unreciprocal risk of harm, and should be liable. 6
duct has blurred the distinction between what is justified action and what is excusable.
Id. at 561. The reasonable man standard results in a tautology: Reasonable people pre-
sumably want to maximize the good of the community, and so, to ask what a reasonable
man would do is merely to ask if the contested action maximizes the good. Id. at 560.
Or, in similar utilitarian rhetoric, courts instinctively ask if the risks associated with the
action balance with the resultant benefits. Id.
Typically, the reasonableness of the risk determines liability in modern tort law,
and reasonableness "is determined by a straightforward balancing of risks." Id. at 542.
Fletcher would do away with such utilitarian balancing, because it can lead to unfair and
morally unjustified results. For example, he cites as unfair the ruling in Commonwealth
v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (1844), in which the court convicted a woman of bigamy
even though the defendant believed her husband dead. Under this blurred utilitarian
balancing, the risks of bigamy did not justify the action; however, a valid mistake of fact
defense could have excused her action.
For a criticism of the pervasive use of reasonableness, rather than protecting rights
- contrasting both American and European jurisprudential philosophies - see Fletcher,
The Right and Reasonable, 98 HARV. L REV. 949 (1985).
159 Fletcher, supra note 155, at 540. CALABRESI & HIRSCHOFF, supra note 146, at
1079.80, criticized Fletcher's analysis of reciprocity as something that simply approximates
which party would be most able to evaluate the costs and benefits of a given transac-
tion. The authors further argued that Fletcher's emphasis on corrective justice - placing
liability on who deserves it - is shortsighted. Id. The desire to distribute wealth has his-
torically played a role in judicial decisions, and the authors criticize Fletcher for
"writ[ing] off distributional considerations . . . with a reference to Aristotle and a com-
ment that taxation is for legislatures and not for courts." Id. at 1081.
160 Fletcher, supra note 155, at 546. To bolster his argument, Fletcher reinterpreted
older, often exotic, cases to show the versatility of his standard of fairness. Fletcher in-
terpreted Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 LR.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L 1868), in light of his stan-
dard of fairness. He said the Rylands "non-natural use" distinction could be interpreted
as a risk to which the community was unaccustomed, and as such, represented a non-
reciprocal risk. (For a discussion of Rylands, see supra notes 49-57 and accompanying
text.) Fletcher similarly described the unsolicited use of a pier during a storm as creating
a risk of harm to the plaintiff "of a different order" than any risk posed by the
plaintiff. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).
In both cases, the defendants' actions created a harm of a different order that the risks
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Fletcher's rhetoric is uncommonly satisfying not just for its
simplicity,"' but also for its focus on the vulnerability of the in-
jured parties. 16' Fletcher primarily invoked John Rawls' first
principle of justice that "we all have the right to the maximum
amount of security compatible with a like security for everyone
else." 8' Fletcher refused to sanction individuals who "knowingly
and voluntarily create risks without responsibility for the harm
they might cause." In his words, an individual "cannot fairly be
expected to suffer ... in the name of a utilitarian calculus. "164
Fletcher's standard of fairness supports landowner liability for
personal injury caused by a contaminated property. In Fletcher's
terminology, each of the plaintiffs described in the introduction
were exposed to nonreciprocal risks. Mr. Stevens and Mr. Wise
thought they were doing their jobs, but the land on which they
the plaintiff imposed on the defendant.
161 Fletcher admitted the theory's shortcomings in applying the standard of fairness
to actions which caused a nonreciprocal risk, but which were also socially useful. For
example, "motoring, airplane overflights, air pollution, oil spillage, sonic booms - in
short, the recurrent threats of modern life" would be difficult to categorize. Fletcher, su-
pra note 155, at 570. Legal scholars have attacked his theory for this and other per-
ceived weaknesses. Professor Attanasio argued that Fletcher's definition of a reciprocal
risk lacked the substance needed to decide just what actions should be free of liability.
Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to Products
Liability, 74 VA. L REV. 677, 705 (1988). In his own defense, Fletcher admitted that
since no two people act exactly the same - not all dog owners have pit bulls - classi-
fying risks as reciprocal will take some metaphorical leaps. Fletcher, supra note 155, at
572. But Fletcher correctly argued that metaphor is no less powerful than theories which
rely on a purported scientific theory for support. Id. at 573.
Like Attanasio, Professor Stephen D. Sugarman was initially attracted by the sim-
plicity of Fletcher's standard of fairness, but ultimately deemed it incomplete. Sugarman,
Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 606 (1985). For Sugarman, Fletcher's
definition of nonreciprocal risks "leaves too much of tort law unexplained." Preexisting
relationships like non-negligent driver and injured passenger, or non-negligent doctor and
injured patient involve nonreciprocal risks, but Sugarman argued that the negligence
standard better explains the liability associated with those relationships. Sugarman also
criticized the theory for its inability to assess the legal relationship between unequal par-
ties, like a bicyclist injured by a motorcyclist or a cattle farmer injured by his crop dust-
ing neighbor. Id. For a list of other articles critical of Fletcher's standard of fairness, see
Id. at n.229.
162 For a discussion of how Fletcher's notion of reciprocal risks lends itself to the
application of strict liability, see Honabach, Toxic Torts-Is Strict Liability Really the "Fair
and Just" Way to Compensate the Victims?, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 305 (1982). Honabach ar-
gued that the value of Fletcher's theory is its insight into how we as a community as-
sociate with victims of non-reciprocal risks, and so, feel comfortable in applying strict lia-
bility. Id. at 320. Honabach warned against applying strict liability without a further as-
sessment of its implications. Id. at 321.
163 FLETCHER, supra note 155, at 550.
164 Id. at 568.
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worked was poisoning them. Conversely, those two workers did
not expose the landowners to any reciprocal risks by virtue of
their labors. With respect to MacNeal Hospital cancer patients,
their passive exposure represents an even stronger example of a
nonreciprocal risk. Those Chicago-area residents posed no threat
whatsoever to the landowners of the asbestos plants.
Fletcher's standard of fairness also took account of the
defendant's rights, and granted two exceptions for liability. Yet,
even his exceptions would not relieve landowner liability for poi-
sonous properties. Under Fletcher's theory, a defendant could
avoid liability, regardless of a plaintiff's circumstances,165 if the
defendant acted either out of "compulsion" or out of an "un-
avoidable ignorance." A person is entitled to the "compulsive"
exception when reacting to a dangerous situation. As an example,
Fletcher used Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co.,166 in which a
cab driver jumped from a moving cab to flee from a robber.
Even though the driverless cab then struck unwary pedestrians,
Fletcher contended the defendant's rights superseded those of the
injured pedestrians. The cab driver injured the plaintiffs as a re-
sult of an understandable "compulsive" act and, so, qualified for
Fletcher's exception.
Contaminated properties are not the result of a compulsive
act. Neither the shipyard owner in Mr. Stevens' case nor the as-
bestos plants near Chicago's South Side used asbestos because of
some calamity. Fletcher's "compulsive" exception involved an
emergency. The cab driver had little choice but to expose the
pedestrians to danger. The landowners in the Introduction exam-
ples did have a choice. They were not forced to contaminate their
165 Professor Ernest J. Weinrib questioned the validity of separating the evaluation of
the defendant's act and the plaintiff's injury. Weinrib, Undertanding Tort Law, 23 VA..
U. L REV. 485 (1989). To Weinrib, if a defendant's excuse is morally irrelevant to the
plaintiff, then it should not operate at the expense of a plaintiff's right to recover.
"[H]ow do the competing moral considerations that individually support the defendant's
obligations to pay and the plaintiffs right to recover participate in a single mode of
ordering?" Id. at 501. Weinrib 'specifically attacked the coherence of Fletcher's excuses in
Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472, 475 n.10 (1987).
Professor Jules Coleman is yet another legal philosopher who champions corrective
justice for tort law but who nonetheless has difficulty with Fletcher's standard of fair-
ness. "The problem with [Fletcher's] view might then be that the notion of
nonreciprocity of risk is too broad a characterization of wrongfulness to function within
the principle of corrective justice." Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 421, 435 (1982). See also Coleman, The Morality ofStfrid Tort Liability, 18
WM. & MARY L REV. 259 (1976).
166 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1941).
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properties. They were not held at a metaphorical gun-point and
forced to pollute their properties.
To explain his "unavoidable ignorance" exception, Fletcher
evaluated Smith v. Lampe.16' In Smith, an automobile driver no-
ticed a tugboat coming dangerously close to the shore in a dense
fog and honked the horn. Unfortunately, the captain interpreted
the honk as the prearranged signal for guidance, and steered his
tug toward the sound of the horn, causing a barge to hit rocky
shallows and later sink. Since the "unavoidably ignorant" defen-
dant could not have known about the prearranged signal, Fletcher
would not hold him liable under the exception.
Fletcher's example of an unavoidable ignorant act involved an
attempted good act. The defendant in Smith should have been
exonerated, because he thought he was helping the tugboat cap-
tain. But with contaminated properties, landowners do not intro-
duce lethal toxins into their land as a gesture of assistance. The
bad act is not the result of good intentions gone awry. For exam-
ple, toxic dumps do not store, nor do landfills dispose of, lethal
substances. They merely recycle them back into the environment.
No one is made safer by the contaminations. In the case of the
passive landowner, the victim of a third party's contaminating
acts, Fletcher's second exception does not even apply. The passive
owner has not acted in ignorance. The owner simply has not
acted. Invariably, a passive landowner's property becomes lethal
because of just plain ignorance, not unavoidable ignorance.
V. WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW SHOULD NOT BAR
RECOVERY, AND LANDOWNERS MUST BE STRICTLY
LIABLE FOR THE HARM.
Holding landowners strictly liable for the personal injuries
caused by contaminated properties represents a judicial remedy
that supersedes both premises liability and worker's compensation
law. In its opposition to such established doctrines, the duty
opens itself to two primary criticisms: worker injury from expo-
sure to a contaminated property does not justify bypassing exclu-
sivity,16s and, strict liability unnecessarily and unjustly burdens
167 64 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 751 (1933).
168 The exclusivity clause of worker's compensation excludes all other remedies oth-
erwise open for the employee and dependents. Under the clause, neither the employer
nor the employer's insurance carrier are liable beyond worker's compensation payments.
2A A. LARSON, supra note 19, at § 65-67.60.
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landowners of contaminated properties. These criticisms might be
initially appealing, but upon examination they fall short of being
persuasive. Courts have made exceptions to worker's compensa-
tion exclusivity for causes far less significant than personal injury
from poisoned workplaces. 69 In terms of strict liability, the
ubiquitous threat of injury from property contamination warrants
the most severe standard of liability.
A. Worker's Compensation, Though Expanding Has Not Proven
Flexible Enough to Handle Occupational Diseases
Worker's compensation coverage has expanded somewhat to
address the ever-increasing incidence of occupational disease.
170
Former obstacles to occupational disease claims-like demanding a
minimum time of exposure to a toxin, or that the disease must
manifest itself within a given period, or that the disease be medi-
cally distinguishable from non-occupational diseases-initially
thwarted legitimate worker claims.171 Now, most states have sig-
nificantly reduced such barriers. 7 2 Worker's compensation laws,
sometimes prompted by an active judiciary, have adopted relaxed
statute of limitations periods, either expanding them or tying
them to some form of discovery rule.77 Allowable claims now
169 Frank Grad, 301(e) Study Group Reporter, described worker's compensation law
as:
one of those things that deserved a study of its own. Worker's compensation
law was a tremendous advance at the turn of the century, and in fact worked
quite well until the advent of occupational diseases. Worker's compensation was
originally designed for traumatic injuries. It was easy to have an administrative
proceeding when a machine injured a worker. But when you've got an occupa-
tional disease, and a worker having seven prior jobs before contracting cancer,
who is responsible? You run into employer objections and issues of fact which
you never had in traumatic injury cases. Worker's compensation is a fine and
wonderful approach. The only problem is [that] with occupational diseases, it is
being used in ways not originally intended. Nobody could have dreamt of such
complex situations at the turn of the century."
- Telephone interview with Columbia University School of Law Professor Frank Grad
(Sept. 20, 1990).
170 For a discussion of expanded worker's compensation coverage, see 1B A.
LARSON, supra note 19, § 41.20; Peirce & Dworkin, Workers' Compensation and Occupation-
al Disease: A Return to Original Intent, 67 OR. L. REv. 649; Note, Compensating Victims, su-
pra note 44.
171 1B A. LARSON, supra note 19, § 41.30; Note, Compensating Victims, supra note 44,
at 922-24.
172 1B A. LARSON, supra note 19, at § 41.30.
173 Leiberman & Dworkin, Time Limitations Under State Occupational Disease Acts, 36
HASTINGS LJ. 287, 328 (1985). The most restrictive statutes of limitation begin when the
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include dearly nonoccupational diseases that nevertheless were
transmitted in the workplace. For example, a telephone operator
contracted tuberculosis from an infected mouthpiece and recov-
ered under worker's compensation.
7 4
Despite this gradual advancement, worker's compensation law
has yet to expand fast enough to cover the increasing number of
occupational diseases. Larson gave a sobering example that might
explain why some industries have been so slow to react to occupa-
tional diseases. When the state of Wisconsin introduced full cover-
age for silicosis disease, investigators found that almost everyone
who worked in dusty workplaces - granite works, mines, quarries
- had silicosis to some degree. As a result of increased insurance
premiums for monument workers, that industry had to close.
7 5
On the other hand, proponents of worker's compensation
point to Black Lung legislation as a way of addressing occupation-
al disease. These supporters of worker's compensation say legisla-
tive action - like the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969176 and subsequent amendments - should be the guide for
other occupational diseases. The Black Lung legislation came
about as a result of inadequate worker's compensation ben-
efits; 177 yet, in retrospect, few would offer such a targeted re-
sponse to the broad range of occupational diseases.178 What
worker's compensation leaves us, then, is an alternative that either
totally shuts down industry or inadequately compensates victims.
In the context of landowner liability for contaminated proper-
ties, the risk is that critical industry will go the way of the monu-
ment workers in Wisconsin. But fear of losing entire industries
should not block appropriate legal action. Worker's compensation
worker knew or should have known that the disability was a work-related disease.
174 Mason v. Y.W.C.A., 271 App. Div. 1042, 68 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1947). See IB A.
LARSON, supra note 19, § 41.43 n.76.
175 1B A. LARSON, supra note 19, § 41.81.
176 See Ramsey & Haberman, The Federal Black Lung Program-The View From the Top,
87 W. VA. L. REV. 575 (1985); 1B A. LARSON, supra note 19, § 41.90. Pub. L. No. 91-
173, 83 Stat. 7923 (1969). The three subsequent amendments include: Black Lung Bene-
fits Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1643 (1981); Black Lung Benefits
Revenue Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11 (1977); and Black Lung Benefits
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972).
177 See Solomons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative Histoiy Surrounding the Black
Lung Interim Presumption and a Survey of Its Unresolved Issues, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 869
(1981).
178 Larson suggested that the way to understand the Black Lung legislation is "to
abandon any thought of applying familiar workmen's compensation concepts, definitions,
or principles." IB A. LARSON, supra note 19, § 41.92.
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legislation like the Black Lung Act is too specific to handle the
array of occupational diseases now in the workplace. The other
alternative within a worker's compensation' framework is to accept
the patently unjust status quo: denying benefits, while at the same
time denying other judicial remedies for occupational diseases.
This bleak range of alternatives leaves one solution: abandon
worker's compensation. It has proven inflexible and overwhelmed
by injury claims from contaminated properties. The judiciary must
impose strict liability on landowners, despite the worker's compen-
sation bar, because legislatures have been unable to resolve the
injustice."7 9 The judiciary cannot delay in hopes that a legisla-
ture will work toward a solution. As the legislative response to the
301(e) Study showed, lawmakers do not always react to the de-
mands of justice.
180
B. Exclusivity Impedes aJustifed Recovery
In his Law of Workmen's Compensation treatise, Arthur
Larson defined the purest application of worker's compensation
law as a nonfault compensation remedy distributed in "the most
efficient, most dignified and most certain form ... which an en-
lightened community would feel obligated to provide."1"' Un-
fortunately, when faced with the daunting challenge of paying
those injured by fouled properties, our enlightened community
most often attempts to deny benefits. For example, no more than
33 percent of those that die from asbestos exposure have ever
even filed a worker's compensation claim, much less have been
awarded benefits commensurate with the disability."8 ' Worker's
179 The Environmental Law Institute proposed an insightful and far-reaching model
of environmental legislation, which would address causation, statute of limitation, and
bankrupt defendant problems. See Trauberman, Statutoiy Reform of "Toxic Torts': Relieving
Lega4 Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L REv. 177
(1983).
180 For statements of health professionals in support of strict liability for landowners
of environmentally unsafe property, see supra notes 44 and 47.
Frank Grad, 301(e) Study Group Reporter, described as typical Congress' lack of
legislative response to the report: "It's the old story. While there indeed was consider-
able interest for the Report, when it comes time for legis!ation, nobody is anxious to
spend money unless you can show a body count. There has not been the kind of rapid
increases in injuries to encourage major legislation." Telephone interview with Columbia
University School of Law Professor Frank Grad (Sept. 20, 1990). For a related discus-
sion, see Schroeder, Legislative and Judicial Responses to the Inadequacy of Compensation for
Occupational Disease, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (1986).
181 2A A. LARSON, supra note 19, at 7.
182 SUPERFUND HEARING, supra note 31, at 281.
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compensation law seems equally as inadequate when dealing with
occupational diseases in general. While worker's compensation
efficiently handles over 90 percent of the standard accident injury
claims administratively, "well over half" of the chronic occupation-
al disease cases are controverted."' 3 The result of the conten-
tion: only 5 percent of those severely disabled by an occupational
disease receive worker's compensation benefits."s
Given such an inadequate response record to claims, courts
must conclude that worker's compensation law is simply unable to
handle occupational disease claims. Worker's compensation law
has its limits, as illustrated by the traditional exceptions to exclu-
sivity, and within two of those exceptions lies the legal justifica-
tion for abandoning worker's compensation for toxic torts. When
employees are intentionally injured, or are injured in a capacity
other than as an employee, courts have allowed relief despite the
worker's compensation bar. In both contexts, the dual capacity
and the intentional tort exceptions reflect a concern for protect-
ing the reasonable expectations of an employee.
In terms of the intentional tort exception, courts
consistently have refused to apply venerable worker's compensa-
tion principles. Perhaps realizing how current worker's compensa-
tion law can victimize workers who, in turn, have been victimized
by employers, the Supreme Court recently upheld a peculiar ex-
ception to exclusivity. In Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,185 the Court
allowed an award for a migrant worker injured while being trans-
ported in an employer's van. The employer unsuccessfully argued
that Florida's worker's compensation law barred Mr. Barrett's at-
tempt to recover under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act."8 6 The Act allowed a claim in tort for
an intentional violation.
8 7
Adams Fruit represented a chink in the armor of exclusivity.
183 Id.
184 Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 170, at 679 n.138.
185 110 S. Ct. 1384 (1990).
186 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1854 (1988).
187 In his comment about the case, Larson noted United States v. Demko, 385 U.S.
149 (1966), which barred a prisoner/plaintiff from relief under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. The plaintiff was injured while performing a prison task. Contrary to Adams Fruit,
the Supreme Court in Demko upheld worker's compensation exclusivity. Larson consid-
ered these rulings incompatible, and concluded that Adams Fruit was unjustified. He ar-
gued that it was "difficult to believe that Congress meant to create a privileged class, the




Though the injury did not compare to the types of injuries from
contaminated properties, the holding showed that the exclusivity
doctrine was by no means inviolate. The significance of the ruling
was the ability of the court to overturn established doctrine for
the sake of an injustice. Workers injured by contaminated proper-
ties face similarly unjust situations. Mr. Stevens and Mr. Wise, dis-
cussed in the Introduction, were as vulnerable to their hazardous
workplaces as was the migrant worker in Adams Fruit. Employers
often intend to use the toxic products in a workplace, and so,
would be as liable as the employer in Adams Fruit. Yet, even if an
employer did not intend to expose an employee to a toxin - per-
haps because the employer inherited the contamination from a
prior owner - policy concerns for worker safety should override a
strict adherence to worker's compensation exclusivity. By compari-
son, the migrant worker in Adams Fruit knew instantly the extent
of his injury. It took decades for either Mr. Stevens or Mr. Wise
to feel the lethal effects of the contamination. The crippling and
pervasive effects of occupational disease demand the exception be
applied even if the employer could claim lack of intent.
Larson rejected Adams Fruit's claim that the ruling would
encourage safer working conditions. "This sort of argument one
used to hear fifty years ago against compensation acts generally. It
stems from the naive idea that a bad safety record costs the em-
ployer nothing."' 8 Larson argued that employers with poor
188 2A A. LARSON, supra note 19, at 33 (Supp. 1990).Despite Larson's objections,
legal scholars have argued that worker's compensation has actually produced less safe
workplaces. See Amchan, "Callous Disregard" for Employee Safety: The Exclusivity of the
Worker's Compensation Remedy against Employers, 34 LAB. L.J. 683 (1983) (a proposed
amendment to the Occupational Safety and Health Act making employers liable for will-
ful, intentional or grossly negligent acts or omissions). See also Bohyer, The Exclusivity
Rule: Dual Capacity and the Reckless Employer, 47 MoNT. L REv. 157 (1986) (reckless em-
ployer conduct should not be barred from suit in tort); Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Reme-
dy Requirements of Workets' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L REV. 1641 (1983) (outdated
bargain of employer/employee within worker's compensation law warrants reasonable excep-
tions to exclusivity); Note, Workers' Compensation: Expanding the Intentional Toil Exception
to Include Will(4 Wanton, and Reckless Employer Misconduct, 58 NOTRE DAME L REV. 890
(1983) (worker's compensation statutes were ihtended to cover accidents, not purposeful
conduct).
Courts have been sensitive to the possibility of an employer using exclusivity to
shield improper conduct. In Davis v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 596 F. Supp. 780 (N.D. Ohio
1984), the federal district court denied the defendant summary judgment on the grounds
of exclusivity. Mr. Davis crushed his hand when cleaning a machine on the job. After re-
ceiving state worker's compensation benefits, he filed suit in tort against the employer
for its alleged knowledge of the "dangerous and/or hazardous condition, thereby proxi-
mately causing the injuries." Id. at 782. The court in Davis said worker's compensation
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safety records could be driven out of business. While these argu-
ments might be applicable in the Adams Fruit context, they lose
considerable force when dealing with contaminated properties.
Those workplace injuries are insidious, pervasive, and as a result,
much more threatening than a typical industrial accident. Using
Larson's own terminology, those injured by contaminated prop-
erties do not represent a privileged or special class. The sheer
volume of contamination ultimately might make the vast majority
of workers vulnerable. Asbestos alone infected more than twenty-
one million workers.'89 The devastation from such toxins will af-
fect more than a company's safety record, as Larson argued. As-
bestos contamination, for example, made an entire industry insol-
vent, leaving the victims limited relief. The migrant worker ex-
ception in Adams Fruit was relevant, primarily as a recent indica-
tion of the Court's willingness to bypass exclusivity.
The more established exceptions also support an employ-
er/landowner's liability for personal injury from contaminated
property. For example, the doctrine of dual capacity,'9' particu-
statutes do not protect an employer from intentional torts, since "one of the avowed
purposes of the act-to promote a safe and injury free work environment-would not be
fulfilled if an employer could commit an intentional tort with impunity having only to
worry about its worker's compensation premiums rising." Id. at 784-85. (citing
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982)). Espousing much the same rationale as the Amchan
article cited above, the court in Davis concluded: "Workmens' compensation is a social
legislation designed to benefit the injured employee and does not prevent that employee
from seeking out the true wrongdoer whenever possible." 596 F. Supp. at 789. But see,
Poyser v. Newman & Co. Inc., 514 Pa. Super. 32, 522 A.2d 548 (1987) (company policy
forbidding use of safety device on machine, though intentional, no basis for suit in tort).
189 N.Y. Times, July 8, 1990, at F6, col. 3.
190 The doctrine of dual capacity holds that an employer can be liable to an employ-
ee in capacities other than as an employer. While an employer might be protected by
the exclusive remedy provision of worker's compensation law in one capacity, the same
accident could allow tort liability based on the employer's other relationship to the work-
er. For example, an employee injured by an employer's product could sue in two capaci-
ties-as an injured employee covered by worker's compensation law and as a consumer
of that product. Similarly, a company physician is not only a co-employee with the in-
jured worker. The physician is also a professional potentially liable for malpractice. Dual
capacity does not abrogate the exclusive remedy; rather, dual capacity allows suit against
the person occupying a separate legal capacity-who is also the employer.
California boasted the original dual capacity case, Duprey v. Shane, 241 P.2d 78
(Cal. App. 1951), aflrd, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952), as well as numerous subse-
quent rulings. In 1982, however, the state legislature abolished the dual capacity excep-
tion to the exclusive remedy rule, while at the same time significantly increasing the
worker's compensation benefit scale. Cal. Lab. Code § 3602 (West 1982).
Critics consider the dual doctrine indefensible, since the contested injuries occur at
work. Critics argue that by definition such claims are work-related and worker's compen-
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larly in the context of a company physician liable for malpractice
to employees, is philosophically consistent with this duty.
Granting company physicians the protection of worker's com-
pensation contradicts the objectives of the law. 9' Most
workplace injuries caused by co-workers-the kind contemplated
by worker's compensation law-involve no-fault accidents implicitly
connected with the workplace. Malpractice injuries from a compa-
ny physician are neither no-fault nor do they represent an inher-
ent risk of the workplace. 92 One of the justifications for the no-
fault aspect of worker's compensation is that a worker offers im-
munity to colleagues in return for the same protection. But a mis-
diagnosed worker, for example, has little or no chance of injuring
the company physician. In that context, there is no legal justifica-
tion for offering the physician immunity. 93
sation law must be the exclusive remedy. Other arguments against dual capacity include:
industrial accidents are risks inherent to employment; the dual status of the employer is
coincidental to the work-related injury; and widespread employment of the doctrine
could result in endless litigation. Note, The Dual Capacity Doctrine: Piercing the Exclusive
Remedy of Worker's Compensation, 43 U. PxTT. L REV. 1013, 1028 (1982).
Besides those arguments, Larson contends that the doctrine encourages endless
legal fictions, such as an employer being sued as the manufacturer of a product, because
the employer repaired and altered a factory machine. 2B A. LARSON, supra note 19, §
72.81(a). Larson instead argues that dual capacity should be replaced by a "dual perso-
na" rationale. Under a dual persona doctrine, an employer would be liable if it has a
separate legal persona, which has legal obligations separate from the obligations to the em-
ployee. Id. For example, the dual persona doctrine would apply when a defendant prod-
uct manufacturer coincidentally acquire the employer of a plaintiff employee, who previ-
ously was injured by the new employer's product. Even though the manufacturer might
have become the employer, the two legal personas were separate at the time of the acci-
dent; therefore, the employee in that limited context could sue its new employer.
Larson took particular exception to the dual capacity doctrine when applied to
landowners or occupiers. An employer frequently owns or occupies the workplace, so, "if
every action and function connected with maintaining the premises could ground a tort
suit, the concept of exclusiveness of remedy would be reduced to nothingness." Id. §
72.82.
This argument does not apply to a landowner's strict liability for contaminated
properties, since the duty relates to a specific responsibility, not something derived from
"every action and function" related to property ownership.
191 For an analysis of why dual capacity should apply to company physicians, see
Kelly, Workmen's Compensation and Employer Seability: The Dual Capacity Doctrine, 5 ST.
MARY'S LJ. 818 (1974); Note, The No-Duty Rule in New York. Should Company Doctors Be
Considered Co-Employees?, 9 HOFSTRA L REV. 665 (1981); Note, The Malpractice Liability of
Company Physicians, 53 IND. LJ. 585 (1978).
192 In Cucote v. Albert, 521 So. 2d 399 (La. 1988), the Louisiana Supreme Court
held an American Cyanamid 'physician liable for a misdiagnosis of an employee. The
state supreme court distinguished the misdiagnosis from the type of injury contemplated
under the state compensation law. The court refused to consider an injury from a com-
pany doctor as "an inevitable risk in the production process." Id. at 403.
193 Among the numerous cases upholding dual capacity, see McCall v. United States,
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These same arguments support employer/landowner liability
for an environmentally unsafe workplace. The worker injured by a
company physician and the worker injured by a contaminated
workplace typically have reasonable expectations that they are not
in an inherently threatening situation. A patient does not expect
to become more ill after seeing a doctor, and a worker does not,
or should not, expect to contract a disease at a workplace.194 Al-
lowing a company physician immunity violates the sense of fair-
ness associated with the goals of worker's compensation law.
95
680 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (federal employee's suit for medical malpractice not
barred by exclusive remedy provision of Federal Employees' Compensation Act); Wright
v. Dist. Court., 661 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 1983) (Coors beer employee misdiagnosed by com-
pany physician could sue under medical malpractice); Tatrai v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp.,
497 Pa. 247, 439 A.2d 1162 (1982) (hospital employee who became ill on the job could
sue in tort for injury sustained when x-ray foot table collapsed); D'Angona v. County of
Los Angeles,. 27 Cal. 3d 661, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1980) (employee of
county hospital able to sue hospital physician for aggravation of work-related injury). But
see Quinn v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 124 N.H. 418, 469 A.2d 1368 (1983) (dual capacity rec-
ognized in New Hampshire, but has yet to be enforced in any case). For an expansive
list of company physician cases, see 2B A. LARSON, supra note 19, § 72.60.
Contrary to the Colorado Supreme Court approach in Wight, the Illinois and Wis-
consin supreme courts interpret their respective worker's compensation statutes as requir-
ing employers to provide medical services. See McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85
Ill. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876 (1981) and Jenkins v. Sabourin, 104 Wis. 2d 309, 311
N.W.2d 600 (1981).
194 The dissent in McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d
876 (1981), eloquently stated its basis for holding a company physician liable for medical
malpractice: "Patients and doctors have deeply rooted expectations about their roles in
our system of medical care and the legal aspects of their relation. If a private doctor at-
tempted to disclaim liability for malpractice, the law would take a hard look at that agree-
ment." Id. at 360, 423 N.E.2d at 884.
195 Courts have expressed deeply rooted expectations about employer behavior when
confronting employment discrimination. In Hart v. National Mortg. & Land Co., 189
Cal. App. 3d 1434 (1987), 235 Cal. Rptr. 68, the California appellate court rejected the
exclusivity of worker's compensation law and allowed an employee to sue for physical
and emotional damages caused by the sexual harassment, assault, and battery from an-
other employee. The court concluded that "when employers step out of their roles as
such and commit acts which do not fall within the reasonably anticipated conditions of
work, they may not hide behind the shield of worker's compensation." I. at 75. See also
Meninga v. Raley's, 216 Cal. App. 3d 79, 81, 264 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322 (1989) (employer
liable for emotional distress caused by a statutory violation of employment discrimination
due to "unfair and outrageous behavior"). But see Van Biene v. ERA Helicopters, 779
P.2d 315 (Alaska 1989). The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the exclusivity doctrine
did not bar the plaintiff from bringing a suit against the worker's compensation carrier
for negligent safety inspection. On the other hand, the court in Van Biene barred the
plaintiff from bringing a suit of intentional tort for company violations of federal sleep
and rest requirements for pilots. The court in Van Biene said that the worker's compen-
sation carrier could be held liable if the insurer actually inspected the work conditions
prior to the accident. For a discussion of insurance carrier liability, see 2A A. LARSON,
supra note 19, §§ 72.90-95.
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Similarly, exposing a worker to an environmentally dangerous
workplace, and then denying substantive legal .redress, is precisely
the kind of unfairness that led to the initial worker's compensa-
tion laws.' Worker's compensation laws began as a means of
guaranteeing relief, despite customary procedural and evidentiary
burdens when suing employers. Unfortunately, the law has
evolved into an obstruction to legitimate relief for those injured
in an environmentally unsafe workplace.
C. This Duty Represents the Fairest and Most Expedient Way to
Resolve Toxic Torts, Without Placing an Undue Burden on Landowners
Representatives of the American Insurance Association com-
plained that holding landowners strictly liability for toxic tort per-
sonal injuries would be a "wholesale, radical abandonment" of
tort principles. 7 These insurers said the duty would thwart
both justice and accident prevention, 198 presumably because the
added liability would financially overwhelm the landowner. Larson
made a similar objection in discussing the dual capacity doctrine.
He claimed that landowners must be protected from the potential
avalanche of tort suits "if every action and function connected
with maintaining the premises could ground a tort suit." 9'
As the discussions of Rylands, warranty of habitability, mari-
time law, products liability and public nuisance illustrated, strict
liability for injuries caused by contaminated properties is consis-
tent with current legal trends, not an abandonment of
them-wholesale, radical or otherwise. One of the appealing as-
pects of the duty is its specific focus. Unlike maritime law, for in-
stance, where a ship could be considered unseaworthy for a dew-
moistened deck 00 or a short handrail,20' liability to landown-
196 Prior to worker's compensation law, an employer could escape liability by invok-
ing one of the unholy three defenses, assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, or
the fellow servant rule. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 99, at 576.
197 See supra note 31.
198 Id.
199 A. LARSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURY & DEATH 14-
86 (1990). The quote in its entirety reads:
An employer, as part of his business, will almost always own or occupy premis-
es, and maintain them as an integral part of conducting business. If every ac-
tion and function connected with maintaining the premises could ground a tort
suit, the concept of exclusiveness of remedy would be reduced to a shambles.
Id.
200 Stokes v. Amendments Towing Inc., 685 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark. 1988).
201 Ringering v. Compania Maritima De-La-Mancha, 670 F. Supp. 301 (D. Or.), affid,
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ers attaches in only one context: contaminated property. Land-
owners must keep properties free from toxins.
By contrast, attaching the broad-based liability of unseaworthi-
ness to landowners would prohibit businesses from owning
property.202 Strict liability claims for slip-and-fall accidents, for
example, would unnecessarily expose business property owners to
onerous liability. But in the context of protection from contami-
nated properties, both landowners and the judiciary would be
aware of the breadth of liability. In enforcing the duty, courts
could discern which environmentally-based tort actions justifiably
supersede present common law and statutory landowner protec-
tion. To circumvent financial concerns, landowners would factor
the cost of this potential liability into their sales price. Those
properties free from contaminants will be significantly more valu-
able than those poisoned; furthermore, this price differential will
induce landowners to clean the property prior to sale. Instead of
crippling industry, the costs of liability will encourage an efficient
land reclamation, rewarding the conscientious landowner with
more valuable property and an absence of potential liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
All too often, the genesis for tort reform is catastrophe.
Without a catastrophe in this context, the debate about liability
for landowners of poisoned properties can lead to scientifically
unanswerable questions about causation. For example, a 1978
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) study
conservatively estimated that carcinogens in the workplace caused
20 percent of deaths to cancer in our country.03 A subsequent
study published in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute
dropped that estimation to 4 percent.0 4 Regardless of whether
the 4 percent or the 20 percent estimation is accurate (or, for
that matter, the 90 percent estimated by yet another study),
205
848 F.2d 1243 (1987).
2,02 See supra note 199.
203 Brennan, Casual and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous.
substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L REV. 469 (1988) (since scientific probabilities do not
offer proof of causation demanded at trial, a federal agency should regulate hazardous
waste injury payments).
204 Id. at 474.
205 Id. at 473. For standard criticisms of strict liability applications in toxic torts, see
Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L REV. 27, 49 (1987). Rabin
criticizes a strict liability compensation scheme for "1) its failure to discount adequately
for victims contributory responsibility, such as heavy smoking; 2) its tolerance of transfer
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the legal issue is the same. The insistence on scientific clarity for
proof of injury disregards the fact that victims presently have little
recotirse when injured by a hazardous property. In toxic tort liti-
gation, the existence of injury rarely is in dispute. What matters is
who takes responsibility. Enforcing strict liability against landown-
ers of contaminated properties answers that question, while at the
same time, it motivates landowners to disinfect the contaminated
workplaces.
Those wary of strict liability often argue that since the extent
of personal injury from toxic properties is unknown, employing
the legal system's most onerous standard of liability would be im-
prudent. They argue that strict liability would contravene basic
principles of fairness. Such words of caution typically precede a
suggestion that the plaintiff assume the onerous task of proving
negligence or intent.0 6 When such discussions of prudence in-
voke notions of fairness, the root question is: "Fairness to whom?"
The tort system has not been fair to the widows of Mr. Stevens
and Mr. Wise. When our legal system offers limited relief for life-
threatening injuries from contaminated properties, the basic prin-
ciples of fairness simply are not working. Arguing against strict
liability then becomes a way of perpetuating a basic unfair-
ness.
207
Our nation faces an ominous threat from our spoiled proper-
ties. 211 We do not yet know its extent, yet we know we have vic-
payments between responsible sources ... due to problems of casual identification; 3)
its restricted coverage of toxic substances and pollutants; 4) itg inadequate precision in
assigning prevention costs; and 5) its failure to achieve intramural fairness among victims
of the same disease." Id.
206 See supra note 31.
207 For an argument against strict liability, see Honabach, Toxic Torts-Is Strict Liability
Really the 'Fair and Just" Way to Compensate the Victims?, 16 U. RICH. L REv. 305 (1982).
The author argued that the judiciary should not act until it "know[s] far more about the
deterrent and spreading effects that strict liability would engender." Id. at 320. Honabach
cautioned against casting toxic torts in an "us-them" context, since it might cloud the
issue of fairness. He warned that this contentious perspective is merely a way of protect-
ing those parties with whom we identify. Id. at 320 n.40. This argument contradicts the
basic premise of an adversarial system, which absolutely demands an "us-them" confron-
tation. This tenet of tort law should not be abandoned, merely because the extent of lia-
bility from poisoned properties is unknown.
208 For example, the United States Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR) issued a report in 1988 detailing the menace of lead poison to children. AGEN-
CY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERVICES, THE NATURE AND ExTENT OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN THE UNITED
STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1988). This isolated contamination is a microcosm of
the harm facing our society, Among the more startling findings: "[Albout 2.4 million
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tiros like Mr. Stevens, Mr. Wise and the MacNeal cancer patients
- each discussed in the Introduction - that have little or no legal
recourse. The legal community must shift liability to protect these,
and future,, victims. Strict liability is one of the most potent judi-
cial weapons, and the severity of this harm warrants its applica-
tion.
Various strands of law should be bound together to provide a
legal and philosophical justification to hold landowners strictly lia-
ble for personal injuries caused by their environmentally unsafe
properties. An esteemed group of attorneys already recommended
this to Congress; the California Supreme Court applied the same
principles to residential landlords; the seaworthiness doctrine es-
tablishes the same liability for vessel owners; the duty parallels
nuisance and products liability theory; and courts have already
showed a willingness to preempt established legal theories-like
worker's compensation law-in favor of a just resolution. Few
problems are as significant as injuries caused by our fouled envi-
ronment. The injuries have profound societal and ecological rami-
fications. The judiciary must act with courage to remedy the injus-
tices by imposing this duty on landowners.
Walter M. Rogers
white and black metropolitan children, or about 17 percent of such children . . . are ex-
posed to environmental sources of lead at concentrations that place them at risk of ad-
verse health effects." Id. at 4. Since lead toxicity attacks the brain and central nervous
system, even low-level exposure can delay brain development, lower IQ's and impair
hearing. Id. at 1.
Detailing the harm contaminants cause our work force, the National Safe
Workplace Institute estimated that occupational diseases killed as many as 95,000 Ameri-
cans in 1987. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 31, 1990, at 1, col. 1..The Institute also estimated
as much as 10 percent of all cancer deaths are related to occupational diseases. Id.
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